

A Persuasion Dialog for Gaining Access to Information

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Abstract. This paper presents a formal protocol for agents engaged in argumentation over access to information sources. Obtaining relevant information is essential for agents engaged in autonomous, goal-directed behavior, but access to such information is usually controlled by other autonomous agents having their own goals. Because these various goals may be in conflict with one another, rational interactions between the two agents may take the form of a dialog, in which requests for information are successively issued, considered, justified and criticized. Even when the agents involved in such discussions agree on all the arguments for and the arguments against granting access to some information source, they may still disagree on their preferences between these arguments.

To represent such situations, we design a protocol for dialogs between two autonomous agents for seeking and granting authorization to access some information source. This protocol is based on an argumentation dialog where agents handle specific preferences and acceptability over arguments. We show how this argumentation framework provides a semantics to the protocol dedicated to the exchange of arguments, and we illustrate the proposed framework with an example in medicine.

1 Introduction

This paper presents a formal protocol for agents engaged in argumentation over access to information sources. We show how two agents, a client and a server, may dialog so that the client tries to get access to information held by the server while the server tries to convince the client that it cannot give it the access. In that context, gaining access to information can be viewed as an argumentation dialog [20, 19, 18] where agents exchange arguments and counter-arguments in order to set common agreements about authorizations. Agents present arguments which represent their own point of view, i.e. arguments they consider as the more persuasive. Multi-agent dialog based on argumentation [18, 17, 22, 16] for information-seeking [5, 23] as well as preference-based argumentation systems [3, 2, 1, 6] have already been studied. These preferences over arguments help agents to characterize their own acceptable arguments which represent the foundation on which agents accept or not to change authorizations: that is, agents controlling access

to information consider to be persuaded as long as their acceptable arguments against giving permission have not been sufficient to persuade their opponent.

There are very few papers dealing with the problem of how agents may control the access [8, 9, 11] in the context of an argument-based persuasion framework. None of them describe this process in the context of an explicit link between permissions and arguments for and against these permissions. This explicit link enables agents to justify why they provide or do not provide information and thus gives an explicit semantics of the persuasion dialog in terms of arguments about permissions. In [13, 12], we present in an informal way a persuasion protocol that embeds this explicit link between arguments and permissions. This paper formalizes this informal protocol.

In this paper, we propose a *persuasion* protocol based on FIPA-ACL oriented performatives [15] which are widely accepted for describing agents dialogs. This protocol is defined in a formal way. A key issue is that the client and the server select and evaluate the received arguments according to their own notion of acceptability: for instance if the server handles preferences over arguments, it evaluates if the received argument is more convincing than the arguments that backed the refusal of access. The contribution brought by this formalization is twofold: a formal description of the different steps that may occur in the persuasion dialog and a semantics of the protocol in terms of multiple preference-based argumentation systems.

The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we present a motivating example. In section 3 we present the formal framework for representing argumentation-based dialog. In section 4 we describe the protocol that rules the dialog, its characteristics and properties. In section 5 we revisit the initial motivating example and express it in a formal way. We conclude the paper in section 6.

2 A Motivating Example

Robert is a British businessman visiting Brussels for a meeting. During his visit he becomes ill and is taken unconscious into hospital. The staff of the hospital suspect Robert has had a heart attack and seek to prescribe appropriate drugs for his condition. Unfortunately the safe choice of drugs depends upon various factors, including prior medical conditions that Robert might have and other drugs he may be taking. The hospital's agent is given the goal of finding out the required information about Robert, from the agent representing his London doctor.

In order to gain access to information about Robert, the agent of Brussels Hospital establishes the following dialog with the London agent:

Agent of Brussels Hospital: I would like to dialog with the agent of Robert's British doctor; I request Robert's health record.

London agent: I cannot provide you Robert's health record because Robert has only given his British doctor limited consent to pass on his personal information (argument A_1).

Brussels agent: This record could possibly include information that could affect the treatment of Robert's heart failure. I request it, Robert's life may be at stake (argument A_2)!

London agent: I cannot divulge this information, because British law prohibits passing on information without the consent of the provider of the information (argument A_3).

Brussels agent: EC law takes precedence over British law when it would be in the interests of the owner to divulge the information (argument A_4). You should allow me to access the record.

London agent: Only Robert could decide what would be in his interests (argument A_5).

Brussels agent: Robert's doctor owes a duty of care to Robert and, should he die, the doctor might be sued by his family, or the Brussels hospital, or both (argument A_6).

London agent: OK. I provide you the requested record: Robert's history of diabetes is...

As we can see, there are numerous key issues in this dialog. First the Brussels and London agents set an agreement about information that is considered: setting/getting access to some information. Second, London agent interacts with Brussels agent because it *controls* information about Robert's health record. Next London agent presents an argument A_1 which attacks the Brussels agent's request: argument A_1 is an argument against giving permission to Brussels agent; in other words *permissions are argued*. Then Brussels and London agents exchange counter-arguments ($A_2...$). It follows that they both *share* the same set of arguments (they understand each other) and they also share the notion of attack. Indeed they agree in an implicit way that the proposed argument by the opponent attacks the previously proposed argument. At the end of the dialog, London agent accepts the final Brussels' argument A_6 . It follows that in an implicit way, London agent agrees that argument A_6 is an acceptable argument which supports the permission in favor of Brussels. Consequently, London agent *changes the permission* and *provides* the requested information to Brussels agent.

In the following we describe a formal system that embed this kind of dialog.

3 Formal Framework

In this section we describe in a formal way the main concepts that have been previously introduced: access rights, primitives of dialogs and arguments which help us to specify the persuasion process.

First we give some preliminaries. Let Ag be the set of agent identifiers (id). In the following an agent id is represented by a lower case Roman letter (x, y, \dots). We assume the information requested is identified by lower case Greek letters (ϕ, ψ, \dots). Let Inf be the set of all possible information ids. This information may be any of: a data record (e.g., one patient's record); a database (e.g., records of many patients); or even the protocol for another dialog (e.g., a client may first request a server to enter into a second dialog, which requires authorization to engage in). The actual content corresponding to information ϕ is denoted by $\langle \text{content } \phi \rangle$.

3.1 Access to information

The permission a participant x has to access the content of information ϕ is denoted by a function $\text{perm}(y, x, \phi)$: $\text{perm}(y, x, \phi) = 1$ (respectively 0) stands for agent y can

give (respectively cannot give) to agent x the content of information ϕ . Formally,

$$\text{perm} : \text{Ag} \times \text{Ag} \times \text{Inf} \mapsto \{0, 1\}$$

Permission is closely linked to the notion of control. An agent can define permissions about information ϕ only if it actually controls the access to ϕ . In the following we represent this notion of control through a function control which associates agents and pieces of information:

$$\text{control} : \text{Ag} \mapsto 2^{\text{Inf}}$$

By splitting control and permission we avoid the problem that an agent gives itself permissions to all pieces of information. For instance, if we consider the motivating example, the agent of Brussels Hospital should not give itself a permission for accessing Robert's file; the permission should be given by the agent of Robert's London Doctor since it is this agent that control the access to the file.

Example 1. Let us consider the initial intuitive example. Let $\text{Ag} = \{b, l\}$ s.t. b is Brussels agent id and l is London agent id; let ρ stands for "Robert's health record" and thus $\text{Inf} = \{\rho\}$. London's control and permission are defined as follows:

$$\rho \in \text{control}(l) \quad \text{perm}(l, b, \rho) = 0$$

3.2 Primitives of dialogs

This is the syntax of a persuasion dialog system for information-seeking which requires permission to access the information.

Participants There are two participants, a *Client* (requesting information), and a *Server* (controlling access to some information, which it may or may not agree to provide).

Dialog goal The Client has the following goal prior to the start of the interaction: to obtain from the Server all the information it needs, using persuasion if necessary.

The Server has the following goal prior to the start of the interaction: To provide information to the Client according to the level of access permission the Client has.

Context Client and Server may have disjoint knowledge bases. The knowledge base of the Server includes information about the access permissions which each Client has, which may differ by the information concerned.

Arguments We assume the arguments exchanged by agents are represented by upper Roman letters (A, B, \dots). The internal structure of an argument is left abstract.

Communication language The primitives of the dialogs presented hereafter are mainly based on [15]. The minimum locutions needed for a dialog between Client x and Server y are:

OpenDialogue(x, y) Client x indicates to Server y that it wants to enter into a dialog.

Ask(x, y, ϕ) Client x asks Server y to provide it with some information ϕ .

Tell($y, x, \langle \text{content } \phi \rangle$) Server y provides Client x with the actual content of information ϕ .

DontTell(y, x, ϕ) Server y indicates to Client y that it cannot provide x with information ϕ .

EndDialogue(x, y) Agent x indicates to Agent y that it wants to leave the dialog.

In case Client x would not have the permission to access information ϕ , an argumentation dialog about the addition of this permission in Server y 's knowledge base is engaged. In this case, a locution for arguing about the permission related to requested information ϕ may be uttered:

Argue(z, t, ι, A, ϕ) Agent z gives to agent t an argument A stating why the permission should be equal to value ι . In the following, **Argue**($x, y, 1, A, \phi$) stands for Client x gives an argument A to Server y as to why it should have the permission (to access ϕ) while **Argue**($y, x, 0, A, \phi$) stands for Server y gives to Client x an argument A as to why x cannot have access (to information ϕ).

3.3 Argumentation framework

In our proposal we require an argumentation framework that enables agents to share the same set of arguments and the same defeat relation between arguments. In addition, each agent should be able to determine its own set of acceptable arguments. It means that even if each agent is able to determine if an argument or a counter-argument is acceptable, it has to share with its opponent the same notion of counter-argument; that is they share the same notion of defeat. Arguments and defeat relation can be represented using the system proposed by [14]. Handling preferences over arguments is one of the simplest way for representing different points of view over the same set of arguments. [1] has presented an extension of [14] that takes into account a unique preference relation. [6] has presented another extension where values are associated to arguments and each agent defines its own set of preferences over these values, and thus over arguments. At this stage, we do not need to enforce the usage of a specific notion of acceptability. Hence each agent evaluates the set of arguments with respect to its own notion of acceptability and its own set of preferences. Formally, we obtain the following definition:

Definition 1 (MPAF). A Multiple preference-based argumentation framework (MPAF) is a tuple

$$\langle \text{Arg}, \mathfrak{R}, \bigcup_{x \in \text{Ag}} \succsim_x, \text{acceptable} \rangle$$

where:

- Arg is a set of arguments,
- \mathfrak{R} is a defeat relation: $\mathfrak{R} \subseteq \text{Arg} \times \text{Arg}$,
- $\bigcup_{x \in \text{Ag}} \succsim_x$ is a set of preference relations s.t. \succsim_x stands for the preference relation over arguments associated with agent x and each relation \succsim_x is a partial pre-order.
- acceptable is a function which maps agent ids to a subset of Arg which characterizes acceptability, $\text{acceptable} : \text{Ag} \mapsto 2^{\text{Arg}}$. $\text{acceptable}(x)$ stands for the acceptable set of arguments associated to agent x . Each set $\text{acceptable}(x)$ is a subset of Arg defined w.r.t. the defeat relation \mathfrak{R} and preference relation \succsim_x .

The strict order associated with \geq_x is denoted by $>_x$. $A >_x B$ means that agent x strictly prefers argument A to B . The sets of acceptable arguments may be defined by using semantics which characterize the policy of the access control. For instance, in a context where information is sensitive the notion of acceptability will be restrictive, whereas a standard notion of acceptability such as the semantics of [14] or [1] may be considered in a context where information has not a high level of confidentiality.

In this paper, we focus on a usage of an acceptability based on the sets of arguments which are conflict-free [14, 1]. Let us stress that the usage of some specific notion of acceptability does not prevent the general aspect of the framework.

We rephrase the notion of *defence* and *admissible* arguments in the context of multiple preferences. An argument A is x -defended by a set of arguments S w.r.t. a preference relation \geq_x iff (i) A defends itself (it is preferred to all its counter-argument) or (ii) for every counter-argument B , there exists an argument C which belongs to S such that C defeats B and B is not preferred to C :

Definition 2 (x -defense). Let $S \subseteq \text{Arg}$ be a set of arguments and $A \in \text{Arg}$ be an argument. A is x -defended by S iff $\forall B \in \text{Arg}$ s.t. $(B, A) \in \mathfrak{R}$ then: (i) $A >_x B$ or (ii) $\exists C \in S$ s.t. $(C, B) \in \mathfrak{R}$ and $B \not>_x C$.

The next step is to rephrase the notion of *conflict-free* set of arguments: all the arguments belonging to an x -conflict-free set of arguments are preferred to their counter arguments w.r.t. a preference relation \geq_x :

Definition 3 (x -conflict-free). A set S is said to be x -conflict-free iff $\forall A, B \in S$, if $(B, A) \in \mathfrak{R}$ then $A \geq_x B$.

The next step is to characterize the admissible arguments.

Definition 4 (x -admissible). A set S of arguments is said to be x -admissible iff S is x -conflict-free and S x -defends all its elements.

The set of acceptable arguments for an agent x is calculated w.r.t. the set of x -admissible arguments. In a classical way we have the skeptical and the credulous methods for characterizing the set of acceptable argument.

Definition 5 (Credulous and Skeptical acceptability). Let Arg be a set of arguments, \mathfrak{R} be a defeat relation and \geq_x be a preference relation. The credulous set of acceptable arguments $\text{Cr}(x)$ defined w.r.t. x is:

$$\text{Cr}(x) = \{A \in \text{Arg} \mid \exists S \text{ s.t. } S \text{ is } x\text{-admissible and } A \in S\}$$

and the skeptical set of acceptable arguments $\text{Sk}(x)$ defined w.r.t. x is equal to:

$$\text{Sk}(x) = \{A \in \text{Arg} \mid \forall S \text{ s.t. } S \text{ is } x\text{-admissible and maximal w.r.t. } \subseteq, A \in S\}$$

Example 2. Let us pursue our review of the intuitive example. The associated MPAF is defined as:

- set Arg is equal to $\{A_1, A_2, A_3, A_4, A_5, A_6\}$;




Fig. 1. Defeat Relation over arguments set Arg

- relation \mathfrak{R} is defined as shown on figure 1.
An arrow between two arguments represents a defeat. That is, argument A_1 is defeated by arguments A_2 and A_6 ; argument A_2 is defeated by argument A_3 . All these defeats are defined in the two directions. Finally argument A_3 is defeated by argument A_4 and argument A_5 defeats A_4 .
- Preference relations for Brussels and London agents are defined as follows (respectively \geq_b and \geq_l):

$$\geq_b := A_2 >_b A_1, A_2 >_b A_3, A_6 >_b A_1, A_6 >_b A_3$$

$$\geq_l := A_3 >_l A_2, A_1 >_l A_2$$

- Function acceptable is defined as follows. We suppose that both London and Brussels agents use a credulous acceptability. In order to define what arguments are acceptable for each of them, we first calculate the maximal sets which are b -admissible and l -admissible:

$$b\text{-admissible set} = \{A_2, A_5, A_6\}$$

$$l\text{-admissible sets} = \{A_1, A_3, A_5\} \text{ and } \{A_5, A_6\}$$

Second, we associate acceptable arguments to each agent

$$\text{acceptable}(b) := \text{Cr}(b) = \{A_2, A_5, A_6\}$$

$$\text{acceptable}(l) := \text{Cr}(l) = \{A_1, A_3, A_5, A_6\}$$

3.4 Linking Arguments and Permissions

As shown in the intuitive example, arguments proposed by the Client and the Server are closely connected to their goals. The goal of the Client is to obtain information ϕ while the Server aims at not telling ϕ . In our framework, goals can be rewritten as changing the permission or not. It leads us to the idea that we have to connect permissions and arguments; we represent this link by introducing a relation between permissions and arguments which characterizes the notion of *argued permission*. The argued permissions are defined in the knowledge base of the Server and characterize its attitude toward the clients.

Definition 6 (argued permission). An argued permission is a tuple $\langle A, y, x, \phi, \iota \rangle$ s.t. A is an argument, y and x are Server and Client agent ids, ϕ is an information and ι is the value of the permission ($\iota \in \{0, 1\}$). $\langle A, y, x, \phi, \iota \rangle$ stands for: Server y has the argument A in favor ($\iota = 1$) or against ($\iota = 0$) giving permission to Client x to obtain information ϕ .

In fact, it is possible for Server y to consider arguments in favor of giving permission to x about ϕ and at the same time arguments against the same permission. For instance, an agent should not give access to its password for security reason (argument against the permission) and at the same time it may provide it in emergency (argument in favor of the permission). It follows that there is no redundancy to consider a function that describes permissions and arguments in favor or against permissions. However we have to enforce some constraints on permissions by introducing the notion of *consistent* permission. Let us consider Client x , Server y and information ϕ . We claim that a permission defined by y about x and ϕ is *consistent* with a set of argued permissions if (i) y has the control of ϕ (ii) arguments for and against permissions respect the defeat relation and (iii) this permission is “supported” by at least one argument that is acceptable w.r.t. $\text{acceptable}(y)$.

Definition 7 (Consistent permission). Let AP be a set of argued permissions and let $\text{P} = \{\langle A, y, x, \phi, \iota \rangle\}$ be the set of argued permission supporting permission $\text{perm}(y, x, \phi) = \iota$ and $\text{C} = \{\langle A, y, x, \phi, 1 - \iota \rangle\}$ be the set of argued permissions against $\text{perm}(y, x, \phi) = \iota$. Permission $\text{perm}(y, x, \phi) = \iota$ is said to be consistent iff:

1. $\phi \in \text{control}(y)$;
2. argued permissions are constrained by the defeat relation: $\forall \langle A, y, x, \phi, \iota \rangle \in \text{P}$ such that for any y -admissible set S where $A \in \text{S}$, if $\text{C} \neq \emptyset$ then $\nexists \langle B, y, x, \phi, 1 - \iota \rangle \in \text{C}$, $B \in \text{S}$;
3. the following constraint holds between the permission and acceptable arguments:

$$\text{perm}(y, x, \phi) = \iota \iff \exists \langle A, y, x, \phi, \iota \rangle \in \text{AP} \text{ s.t. } A \in \text{acceptable}(y)$$

The main consequence is that if Server y has adopted a skeptical acceptability relation, then there are no two arguments that belong to the set $\text{acceptable}(y)$ which support opposite permissions.

Proposition 1. Let $\text{perm}(y, x, \phi) = \iota$ be a permission. Let $\text{C} = \{\langle A, y, x, \phi, 1 - \iota \rangle\}$ be the set of argued permissions against $\text{perm}(y, x, \phi) = \iota$. Let $\text{Sk}(y)$ be the set of acceptable arguments. No element of C belongs to $\text{Sk}(y)$: $\text{C} \cap \text{Sk}(y) = \emptyset$.

Notice that the credulous notion of acceptability may entail that acceptable arguments can be in favor and or against a permission at the same time and thus the previous proposition does not hold.

Example 3. Let us pursue our intuitive example. London agent informs that it cannot provide information about Robert because Robert has only given a limited consent (argument A_1). It follows that A_1 is an argument against the request of Brussels agent and that tuple $\langle A_1, l, b, \rho, 0 \rangle$ is an argued permission. However, this argument is not the only

one against giving access to Brussels agent. Argument A_3 is also against the authorization while arguments A_2 and A_6 are in favor of the authorization. We get the following set of argued permissions:

$$AP = \{\langle A_1, l, b, \rho, 0 \rangle, \langle A_3, l, b, \rho, 0 \rangle, \langle A_2, l, b, \rho, 1 \rangle, \langle A_6, l, b, \rho, 1 \rangle\}$$

Notice that permission $\text{perm}(l, b, \rho) = 0$ is consistent: first agent l has control of ρ (see example 1); second, all arguments in favor of permission do not appear at the same time in a same l -admissible set (e.g. $A_1 \in \{A_1, A_3, A_5\}$ but A_2 and A_6 do not belong to $\{A_1, A_3, A_5\}$ and third, there exists an argument involved in an argued permission that is acceptable (e.g. $A_3 \in \text{acceptable}(l)$).

4 The protocol of persuasion

In this section, we present a protocol of dialog for information-seeking dialog with permissions. The protocol specifies which locutions may be uttered at different points in a dialog, and so defines the rules governing the use of the locutions previously presented. Now we formally define the concept of dialog. A dialog is a structure that combines access authorizations, a multiple preferences argumentation framework, a set of argued permissions, and a sequence of locution utterances.

Definition 8 (Dialog). Let $D = \langle \text{control}, \text{perm}, \text{MPAF}, \text{AP}, \sigma \rangle$ be a dialog such that control is a function associating agents and information, perm is an authorization function, MPAF is a multiple preferences argumentation framework, AP is a set of argued permissions and σ is a sequence of locutions.

Let length be a function characterizing the number of elements of a finite sequence of locutions σ and $\sigma[i]$ (s.t. $1 \leq i \leq \text{length}(\sigma)$) represents one element of σ . Now we can express in a formal way the protocol: how the permissions and the arguments are interwoven in order to rule the dialog.

4.1 Requesting information

First we specify that Client x and Server y have to initiate the dialog. Let $D = \langle \text{control}, \text{perm}, \text{MPAF}, \text{AP}, \sigma \rangle$ be a dialog s.t. σ is a finite sequence: $\exists n$ s.t. $n = \text{length}(\sigma)$. In all the following formulas, logical connectors are used w.r.t. their usual meaning. After opening the dialog, the Client requests some information ϕ (formula (R1)):

$$\sigma[1] = \text{OpenDialogue}(x, y) \implies \sigma[2] = \text{Ask}(x, y, \phi) \quad (\text{R1})$$

Formula (R2) states that the Server should provide ϕ if the Server control ϕ and the Client has the authorization to access information ϕ :

$$\begin{aligned} \sigma[2] = \text{Ask}(x, y, \phi) \wedge \phi \in \text{control}(y) \wedge \text{perm}(y, x, \phi) = 1 \implies \\ \sigma[3] = \text{Tell}(y, x, \langle \text{content } \phi \rangle) \quad (\text{R2}) \end{aligned}$$

Formula (R3) states that if the Server has no control over ϕ then it should close the dialog:

$$\sigma[2] = \mathbf{Ask}(x, y, \phi) \wedge \phi \notin \text{control}(y) \implies \sigma[3] = \mathbf{EndDialogue}(y, x) \quad (\text{R3})$$

Formula (R4) specifies that if the Server has actually provided information ϕ then the dialog is closed by the Server:

$$\sigma[i] = \mathbf{Tell}(y, x, \langle \text{content } \phi \rangle) \implies \sigma[i + 1] = \mathbf{EndDialogue}(y, x) \quad (\text{R4})$$

Now let us focus on the case which will lead us to the argumentation part of the dialog; that is, where the Server cannot provide information ϕ to the Client. Formula (R5) formally specifies the condition where a **DontTell** locution can be uttered.

$$\begin{aligned} \sigma[2] = \mathbf{Ask}(x, y, \phi) \wedge \phi \in \text{control}(y) \wedge \text{perm}(y, x, \phi) = 0 &\iff \\ \sigma[3] = \mathbf{DontTell}(y, x, \phi) & \quad (\text{R5}) \end{aligned}$$

4.2 Arguing for getting permission

In this section we describe the rules that characterize the persuasion stage. Formula (G1) states that argumentation occurs only if the Server does not want to provide information to the Client:

$$\begin{aligned} \forall i > 3 (\sigma[i] = \mathbf{Argue}(y, x, 0, A, \phi) \vee \sigma[i] = \mathbf{Argue}(x, y, 1, A, \phi) \\ \implies \sigma[3] = \mathbf{DontTell}(y, x, \phi)) \quad (\text{G1}) \end{aligned}$$

If the Server refuses to answer the Client the argumentation stage is initiated. In this paper, for the sake of conciseness we assume that this stage is initiated by the Server. Formula (G2) specifies that the Server has to motivate its refusal.

$$\begin{aligned} \sigma[3] = \mathbf{DontTell}(y, x, \phi) \wedge \exists A \text{ s.t. } \langle A, y, x, \phi, 0 \rangle \in \text{AP} \implies \\ \sigma[4] = \mathbf{Argue}(y, x, 0, A, \phi) \quad (\text{G2}) \end{aligned}$$

As the Server has given a rationale to the Client, the Client should reply to the Server. Formulas (G3) state that both agents should present acceptable arguments:

$$\begin{aligned} \sigma[i] = \mathbf{Argue}(y, x, 0, A, \phi) \implies A \in \text{acceptable}(y) \\ \sigma[i] = \mathbf{Argue}(x, y, 1, A, \phi) \implies A \in \text{acceptable}(x) \quad (\text{G3}) \end{aligned}$$

Agents are thoughtful according to [18]'s assertion attitudes. Now both Client and Server should present arguments in order to counter the opponent. Let us first focus on the Client. When Client x evaluates the argument proposed by Server y it may face two cases whether it can reply or not to the Server:

The client can reply Whether the received argument is acceptable or not, Client x argues as long as it can. In such a configuration, Client x considers all of its *acceptable* arguments that defeat the received argument and presents them to the Server.

Formula (G4) specifies this counter-argumentation as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} \sigma[i] = \mathbf{Argue}(y, x, 0, A, \phi) \wedge A \notin \text{acceptable}(x) \implies \\ (\exists B \in \text{acceptable}(x) \wedge (B, A) \in \mathfrak{R}) \left((\nexists j < i (\sigma[j] = \mathbf{Argue}(x, y, 1, B, \phi))) \right. \\ \left. \implies (\exists k > i (\sigma[k] = \mathbf{Argue}(x, y, 1, B, \phi))) \right) \quad (\text{G4}) \end{aligned}$$

Notice that client x may optimize the counter-argumentation stage by selecting only a subset of counter-arguments among all the possible ones and present them to the server. In this paper, we do not explore this opportunity since it is out of the scope of this paper to evaluate the rationales that support the selection process.

The client cannot reply The dialog is over if Client x can no longer present a counter-argument to Server y , counter-argument which is acceptable for x . Formula (G5) specifies in a formal way the closure of the dialog: the first line states that Client x has received an argument and second, third and fourth lines of formula (G5) state that x has presented all counter-arguments to y ; more precisely the second line states for every argument presented against the permission sent by the Server, Client x has presented (line 4) all the possible counter-arguments (line 3).

$$\begin{aligned} \sigma[i] = \mathbf{Argue}(y, x, 0, A, \phi) \wedge \\ (\forall B, \exists j \leq i (\sigma[j] = \mathbf{Argue}(y, x, 0, B, \phi) \implies \\ \forall C \in \text{acceptable}(x) \text{ s.t. } (C, B) \in \mathfrak{R} \\ \exists k < i (\sigma[k] = \mathbf{Argue}(x, y, 1, C, \phi))) \\ \implies \sigma[i+1] = \mathbf{EndDialogue}(x, y) \quad (\text{G5}) \end{aligned}$$

Now, let us focus on the Server side. The formulas are similar to formulas (G5) and (G4): as long as the Server can present arguments to the Client to persuade it to not change the authorization, the Server presents the counter-arguments to the Client. In order to write formulas (G5) and (G7) which specify the structure of the dialog, we first characterize the condition $\Psi(i)$ which holds if at time i all arguments which appear in argued permissions have been sent (lines 1 and 2) and all arguments presented by x have been countered (lines 3, 4 and 5).

$$\begin{aligned} \forall \langle A, y, x, \phi, 0 \rangle \in \text{AP} \\ \exists j ((j < i) \wedge (\sigma[j] = \mathbf{Argue}(y, x, 0, A, \phi))) \wedge \\ \forall B, \exists k (k < i) \wedge (\sigma[k] = \mathbf{Argue}(x, y, 1, B, \phi) \implies \\ \forall C \in \text{acceptable}(y) \text{ s.t. } (C, B) \in \mathfrak{R} \\ \exists l ((l < i) \wedge (\sigma[l] = \mathbf{Argue}(y, x, 0, C, \phi)))) \quad (\Psi(i)) \end{aligned}$$

The Server can reply Formula (G6) is similar to formula (G4) and specifies that Server y presents all possible counter-argument to an argument presented by x :

$$\begin{aligned} \sigma[i] = \mathbf{Argue}(x, y, 1, A, \phi) \wedge \neg\Psi(i) \implies \\ (\exists B \in \text{acceptable}(y) \wedge (B, A) \in \mathfrak{R}) \left((\nexists j < i (\sigma[j] = \mathbf{Argue}(y, x, 0, B, \phi))) \wedge \right. \\ \left. (\exists k > i (\sigma[k] = \mathbf{Argue}(y, x, 0, B, \phi))) \right) \quad (G6) \end{aligned}$$

The Server cannot reply Server y has received an argument and condition $\Psi(i)$ holds (line 1), it entails that Server y should evaluate the whole set of arguments sent by x so that it may change the permission and provide information ϕ , otherwise the dialog is closed:

$$\begin{aligned} \sigma[i] = \mathbf{Argue}(x, y, 1, A, \phi) \wedge \Psi(i) \implies \\ (\sigma[i+1] = \mathbf{Tell}(y, x, \langle \text{content } \phi \rangle) \vee \\ \sigma[i+1] = \mathbf{EndDialogue}(y, x)) \quad (G7) \end{aligned}$$

All these constraints enable to characterize the persuasion dialogs about permissions.

Definition 9 (Permission Persuasion-Dialog). Let $D = \langle \text{control, perm, MPAF, AP, } \sigma \rangle$ be a dialog. D is a permission persuasion-dialog iff (i) all permissions are consistent, (ii) σ is finite and (iii) all formulas (R1)–(R5) and (G1)–(G7) hold.

A permission persuasion-dialog does not specify how the Server may change the permission, it just specifies how arguments may be exchanged and how information may be provided. The key characteristic is that the dialog is finite (definition of D) and “well-defined”, i.e. the constraints ensures that at the end of the dialog all possible relevant arguments have been exchanged:

Proposition 2. For any dialog $D = \langle \text{control, perm, MPAF, AP, } \sigma \rangle$ s.t. be a permission persuasion-dialog, $\Psi(\text{length}(\sigma)) = 1$

The final step is the evaluation of the Client’s arguments by the Server in order to determine if permission has to be changed.

4.3 Changing the permission

Server y changes permission related to x and ϕ with respect to a set of rules which characterize principles of *cautiousness* (the server still has a reason not to change the permission) or *trustfulness* (the server has at least one reason to change the permission):

cautiousness One of the argument presented by the Server has not been defeated by the Client. In other words, the Server has at least one reason for not changing permission. Let (**C-Caut**) be a formula which represents this condition. (**C-Caut**) specifies that the Server has send an argument (line 1) so that the Client has no reply to this

argument (lines 2 and 3) with an argument involved in an argued permission that prevents to give permission (line 3):

$$\begin{aligned} \exists A, \exists i(\sigma[i] = \mathbf{Argue}(y, x, 0, A, \phi) \wedge \\ \nexists B \in \text{acceptable}(y) \text{ s.t. } (B, A) \in \mathfrak{R} \wedge \\ \exists j(\sigma[j] = \mathbf{Argue}(x, y, 1, B, \phi) \wedge \langle B, y, x, \phi, 0 \rangle \notin \text{AP})) \quad (\mathbf{C-Caut}) \end{aligned}$$

Formula (C1) specifies that if all arguments have been exchanged (represented by condition $(\Psi(\text{length}(\sigma) - 1))$ and if condition **(C-Caut)** does not holds (i.e. Client x has countered all the arguments presented by Server y), then server y has to provide ϕ :

$$\begin{aligned} \Psi(\text{length}(\sigma) - 1) \wedge \neg(\mathbf{C-Caut}) \implies \\ (\sigma[\text{length}(\sigma) - 1] = \mathbf{Tell}(y, x, \langle \text{content } \phi \rangle)) \quad (\mathbf{C1}) \end{aligned}$$

Once ϕ has been provided, the dialog is closed (see formula (R4)). It follows that permission has to be updated so that it reflects that Client x can access ϕ . Formula (C2) states that if ϕ has been provided w.r.t. the cautiousness principle then the permission is updated (perm' represents the new permission):

$$\text{perm}'(y, x, \phi) := 1 \iff \Psi(\text{length}(\sigma) - 1) \wedge \neg(\mathbf{C-Caut}) \quad (\mathbf{C2})$$

trustfulness One of the argument presented by the Client is acceptable for Server y . In other words, the Server has at least one reason to change permission. Formula **(C-Trust)** specifies the condition corresponding to this attitude as follows: lines 1 and 2 state that there exists at least one acceptable argument that is not against permission (according to Server point of view):

$$\begin{aligned} \exists A, i(\sigma[i] = \mathbf{Argue}(x, y, 1, A, \phi) \wedge \\ A \in \text{acceptable}(y) \wedge \langle A, y, x, 0, \phi \rangle \notin \text{AP})) \quad (\mathbf{C-Trust}) \end{aligned}$$

Formula (C3) specifies that if condition **(C-Trust)** holds then information ϕ is provided.

$$\begin{aligned} (\Psi(\text{length}(\sigma) - 1) \wedge (\mathbf{C-Trust})) \implies \\ (\sigma[\text{length}(\sigma) - 1] = \mathbf{Tell}(y, x, \langle \text{content } \phi \rangle)) \quad (\mathbf{C3}) \end{aligned}$$

As previously, we now state permission change in a trustfulness context:

$$\text{perm}'(y, x, \phi) := 1 \iff (\Psi(\text{length}(\sigma) - 1) \wedge (\mathbf{C-Trust})) \quad (\mathbf{C4})$$

Since the permission has changed, the set of argued permissions has also to be changed so that the new permission is consistent. That is every argument sent by the Client that is acceptable from the point of view of the Server has to be added to the list of argued

permissions AP. Formula (C5) states that all argument received by y and acceptable by y extend the initial list of argued permissions.

$$AP' := \begin{cases} AP \text{ if } \nexists i(\sigma[i] = \mathbf{Tell}(y, x, \langle \text{content } \phi \rangle)) \\ AP \cup \{ \langle A, y, x, \phi, 1 \rangle \mid \\ \quad \exists i(\sigma[i] = \mathbf{Argue}(x, y, 1, A, \phi) \wedge \\ \quad A \in \text{acceptable}(y)) \} \text{ otherwise} \end{cases} \quad (\text{C5})$$

The first consequence entails by formulas (C1)–(C5) is that the updated permission is still consistent.

Proposition 3. *Let D be a permission persuasion-dialog. Let $\text{perm}'(y, x, \phi)$ and AP' be the updated set of permissions defined w.r.t. formulas (C1) and (C2), or formulas (C3) and (C4); let AP' be the updated set of argued permissions calculated w.r.t. formula (C5). $\text{perm}'(y, x, \phi)$ is consistent with respect to the set AP' .*

The second consequence is an entailment relation between the two policies: a permission that has been given w.r.t. the cautiousness principle entails that the permission should also have been given w.r.t. the trustfulness principle (but not vice-versa). This is due to the fact that whenever condition (**C-Caut**) does not hold, condition (**C-Trust**) holds.

Proposition 4. $\neg(\text{C-Caut}) \implies (\text{C-Trust})$

Notice that trustfulness corresponds to the skeptical acceptance attitude of [18]; cautiousness is an acceptance attitude not taken into account by [18].

We conclude the section by assessing the principle of cautiousness and trustfulness whether Server y uses a skeptical or credulous notion of acceptability. As long as Server y uses a credulous acceptability permissions may change:

Proposition 5. *For all permission persuasion-dialog D s.t. $\text{acceptable}(y) = \text{Cr}(y)$, it holds that*

$$\neg((\phi \in \text{control}(y) \wedge \text{perm}(y, x, \phi) = 0) \implies \nexists i(\sigma[i] = \mathbf{Tell}(y, x, \langle \text{content } \phi \rangle)))$$

As long as Server y uses a skeptical notion of acceptability, Server y never changes its initial permissions and thus will never provide information when initial permission is equal to 0.

Proposition 6. *For all permission persuasion-dialog D such that $\text{acceptable}(y) = \text{Sk}(y)$, it holds that:*

$$(\phi \in \text{control}(y) \wedge \text{perm}(y, x, \phi) = 0) \implies \nexists i(\sigma[i] = \mathbf{Tell}(y, x, \langle \text{content } \phi \rangle))$$

It follows from the previous propositions that an agent which gives to the other agents the ability to persuade itself about permissions should not adopt a too restrictive notion of acceptability. That is, acceptability should be credulous based.

5 Revisiting the initial example

In this section we reformulate the dialog between the agent of Brussels Hospital and the London agent as a permission persuasion-dialog $D = \langle \text{control}, \text{perm}, \text{MPAF}, \text{AP}, \sigma \rangle$ such that control and perm are defined as in example 1, MPAF is defined as in example 2 and AP is defined as shown in example 3. Server y may change permissions w.r.t. trustfulness principle. We have the following sequence σ of locutions (relevant constraints that hold are mentioned on the right part of the locution):

Agent of Brussels Hospital: I would like to dialog with the agent of Robert's British doctor; I request Robert's health record (information ρ).

$$\begin{aligned}\sigma[1] &= \text{OpenDialogue}(b, l) \\ \sigma[2] &= \text{Ask}(b, l, \rho)\end{aligned}\tag{R1}$$

London agent: I cannot provide you Robert's health record because Robert has only given his British doctor limited consent to pass on his personal information (argument A_1).

$$\begin{aligned}\sigma[3] &= \text{DontTell}(l, b, \rho) \\ \sigma[4] &= \text{Argue}(l, b, 0, A_1, \rho)\end{aligned}\tag{R5, G2}$$

Brussels agent: This record could possibly include information that could affect the treatment of Robert's heart failure. I request it, Robert's life may be at stake (argument A_2)!

$$\sigma[5] = \text{Argue}(b, l, 1, A_2, \rho)\tag{G1, G3, G4}$$

London agent: I cannot divulge this information, because British law prohibits passing on information without the consent of the provider of the information (argument A_3).

$$\sigma[6] = \text{Argue}(l, b, 0, A_3, \rho)\tag{G3, G6}$$

Brussels agent: EC law takes precedence over British law when it would be in the interests of the owner to divulge the information (argument A_4). You should allow me to access the record.

$$\sigma[7] = \text{Argue}(b, l, 1, A_4, \rho)\tag{G1, G3, G4}$$

London agent: Only Robert could decide what would be in his interests (argument A_5).

$$\sigma[8] = \text{Argue}(l, b, 0, A_5, \rho)\tag{G1, G3, G6}$$

Brussels agent: Robert's doctor owes a duty of care to Robert and, should he die, the doctor might be sued by his family, or the Brussels hospital, or both (argument A_6).

$$\sigma[9] = \text{Argue}(b, l, 1, A_6, \rho)\tag{G3, G4, G7}$$

London agent: OK. I will provide you with the requested record: Robert’s history of diabetes is...

$$\sigma[10] = \mathbf{Tell}(l, b, \langle \text{content } \rho \rangle) \quad (\text{C3, G7})$$

$$\sigma[11] = \mathbf{EndDialogue}(b, l) \quad (\text{C3})$$

According to the trustfulness principle (formula (C4)), London agent changes the permission, $\text{perm}'(l, b, \rho) = 1$, because there is an l -acceptable argument A_6 that makes condition (**C-Trust**) true. The set of argued permissions is also updated:

$$\text{AP}' = \text{AP} \cup \{\langle A_2, l, b, \rho, 1 \rangle, \langle A_6, l, b, \rho, 1 \rangle\} = \text{AP}$$

6 Conclusion

In this paper, we have presented a formal framework for handling persuasion dialogs about permissions. Our contribution is two fold: first we represent through an explicit link between arguments and permissions why agents accept or refuse to provide information. The agents can thus justify their behavior. Second, we exhibit a specific class of dialogs, *permission persuasion-dialog*, which helps to characterize two policies for handling permission change (cautiousness and trustfulness). We have shown that enabling permission change entails the evaluation of arguments in a credulous way. The proposed protocol has been shown in the context of multiple preferences argumentation framework; however this protocol of persuasion is sufficiently general so that it can be used with other argumentation frameworks.

Our work is closely related to [11] which proposes in a semi-formal way a general framework for persuasion and negotiation dialog for gaining access to sensitive information. A drawback of this work is that permissions are not considered as first-class objects but are rather viewed with the help of the notion of interest. But interest and permission are different notions and thus it could not be established in a clear way why agents propose arguments in the persuasion dialog. Moreover, even if our work is less general than the proposed in [11], we have been able to exhibit interesting characteristics by focusing on a more specific problem: we have shown that persuasion is closely linked to the acceptability notion and we propose a clear definition of persuasion dialog about permission. G. Boella et al. show in [8] how access control can be handled by using plan argument and an argumentation game. A plan argument is close to our notion of argued permission and an argument game describes the protocol of interaction between the Client and the Server. The main drawback is that the protocol is a one shot protocol: it is not shown how the Client and the Server change their initial set of plan arguments so that they exploit the result of the interaction. In [7] J. Bentahar *et al.* show a persuasion dialog framework where trust aspects have been integrated in a persuasion dialog. The main difference with our proposal is the underlying concept of persuasion. In our proposal, the Server is convinced by the Client as long as the Client has proposed some convincing arguments. The persuasion is a two agent process. In [7], persuasion is based on a preliminary step which helps to evaluate the reputation of the Client. We believe that this approach is not suitable for our context. Indeed, even if trust aspects have to be handled in this kind of problem, we believe that the dialog

between the Server and the Client has to be self-contained and thus trust aspects have to be handled by means other than reputation systems.

As future work, we plan to extend the protocol to a family of protocols. That is, in this paper we focus on specific acceptability definitions; our aim is to consider the notions of conflict and acceptability at a more general level and to evaluate the impact on the proposed persuasion protocol. The work made by K. Atkinson *et al* [4] on dialog game for evaluating actions has shown numerous kind of attacks on action proposal. An first work should consist on the rewritten of these different kinds of attacks in our context: that is does the counter-argumentation stage for the Client has the same meaning for the Server? We plan to explore the interest of bipolar argumentation systems [10]. In those systems, a dual relation of the defeat relation is represented which helps to characterize the notion of support in an explicit way. This framework is close to our proposal for representing argued permissions. Our aim is to compare similarities and differences between these two frameworks. We also plan to refine the protocol in order to handle trust issues. That is if a Client has been able to persuade a Server to get permission to access some information, then this result may play the role of an argument in favor of the Client for gaining access to some other information, i.e. the persuasion dialog may be viewed as a trust proof.

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