

The Eightfold Way of Deliberation Dialogue

Peter McBurney
Department of Computer Science
University of Liverpool
Liverpool L69 7ZF, UK
p.j.mcburney@csc.liv.ac.uk

David Hitchcock
Department of Philosophy
McMaster University
Hamilton Ontario
Canada L8S 4K1
hitchckd@mcmaster.ca

and

Simon Parsons
Department of Computer and Information Science
Brooklyn College
City University of New York
Brooklyn NY 11210 USA
parsons@sci.brooklyn.cuny.edu

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Abstract

Deliberation dialogues occur when two or more participants seek to jointly agree an action or a course of action in some situation. We present the first formal framework for such dialogues, grounding it in a theory of deliberative reasoning from the philosophy of argumentation. We further fully articulate the locutions and rules of a formal dialogue game for this model, so as to specify a protocol for deliberation dialogues. The resulting protocol is suitable for dialogues between computational entities, such as autonomous software agents. To assess our protocol we consider it against various records of human deliberations, against normative principles for the conduct of human dialogues, and with respect to the outcomes produced by dialogues undertaken according to the protocol.

1 Introduction

In an influential typology, argumentation theorists Doug Walton and Erik Krabbe [82] classified human dialogues according to the objectives of the dialogue, the objectives of the participants (which may differ from one another) and the information which each participant had available at commencement of the dialogue. This classification

resulted in six primary dialogue types, as follows: **Information-Seeking Dialogues** are dialogues where one participant seeks the answer to some question(s) from another participant, who is believed by the first to know the answer(s). In **Inquiry Dialogues** the participants collaborate to answer some question or questions whose answers are not known to any one participant. **Persuasion Dialogues** involve one participant seeking to persuade another to accept a statement he or she does not currently endorse. In **Negotiation Dialogues**, the participants bargain over the division of some scarce resource. Here, each participant may be seeking to maximize his or her share of the resource, in which case the individual goals of the participants are in conflict. Participants of **Deliberation Dialogues** collaborate to decide what action or course of action should be adopted in some situation. Here, participants share a responsibility to decide the course of action, or, at least, they share a willingness to discuss whether they have such a shared responsibility. In **Eristic Dialogues**, participants seek to vent perceived grievances, and the dialogue may act as a substitute for physical fighting.¹

Formal models of several of these dialogue types have been developed in recent years. For example, models have been proposed for: information-seeking dialogues [36]; inquiry dialogues [53]; persuasion dialogues [4, 82]; and negotiation dialogues [6, 36, 52, 72]. Moreover, since most real-world dialogues are in fact combinations of primary types, models have been proposed for complex combinations of primary dialogues, for example, iterated, sequential, parallel and embedded dialogues [54, 66]. However, to our knowledge, no general, formal model has yet been proposed for deliberation dialogues, and it is the purpose of this paper to present such a model, which we call the Deliberation Dialogue Framework (DDF).² For this framework, we draw upon a model of deliberation decision-making from the philosophy of argumentation, and we use a dialogue-game formalism to define an interaction protocol. Our protocol effectively creates a public space in which multiple participants may interact to jointly decide on a course of action, with the structure and rules of the protocol defining the nature of these interactions.

The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 explores the features of deliberation dialogues which are specific to this type of dialogue. Section 3 presents our formal model of deliberation dialogues, drawing on work in the philosophy of argumentation. This is followed, in Section 4, with a dialogue game formalism for deliberation dialogues which accords with the general model presented in Section 3. The full syntax of the dialogue game locutions and the rules governing their use, however, are presented in an Appendix. This is followed, in Section 5, with an example of the use of our formalism. We then consider, in Section 6, how we may assess our protocol. Here we consider it against various records of human deliberations, against normative principles for the conduct of human dialogues, and with respect to the outcomes produced by dialogues undertaken according to the protocol. The paper ends with a summary of our contribution, along with related and future research, in Section 7.

Before presenting our model, however, there is one aspect of our work which it is important to emphasize. Although our approach is motivated by human deliberation dialogues, we seek in this paper to define a model for deliberation interactions only between computational entities, such as autonomous software agents. We use the term

¹Since Eristic dialogues are not generally rule-governed, formal models of them may be difficult to develop. However, recent work by Dov Gabbay and John Woods has looked at dialogues involving non-cooperation and hostility by the participants [24]. We will not consider them further in this paper.

²Note that in [61], two of us proposed a dialogue-game model for agent dialogues over the use of shared resources, dialogues which may incorporate elements of information-seeking, inquiry, persuasion, negotiation, and deliberation.

dialogue to refer to such interactions because they are analogous to human dialogues, and because they may serve similar, or even identical, purposes to human dialogues.³ However, we are *not* seeking to model human deliberations, or to provide models for natural language explanation, generation or processing. Thus, this paper is not, and does not claim to be, a contribution to computational linguistics. This restricted focus has several implications for our work. Firstly, all utterances in a dialogue between agents conducted according to some protocol may be assumed to accord with the rules of that protocol; if one participant utters expressions invalid according to the rules of the protocol these will not be transmitted to the other participants. This is unlike the situation in human–human or human–machine interactions, where utterances which do not conform to the protocol syntax and combination rules may indeed be transmitted, resulting in considerable efforts being expended by listeners attempting to parse or to understand them. Secondly, we can assume that agents participating in a dialogue do so of their own free volition and may leave at any time. This contrasts with at least one model of human–human dialogues, that of Paul Grice [28, p. 48], where a conversation between two parties can only end when *both* parties agree to its termination. We believe our model is more appropriate for an open computational society of autonomous software agents. Thirdly, our assumption of agent autonomy leads us to assume that agents will not enter any dialogue unless and until they perceive this to be in their self-interest (however conceived by the agent concerned) to do so. In particular, agents will require, before entry, a statement of the intended topic of discussion in the dialogue. Unlike in many human dialogues, agents should not need to infer this from the utterances of others in the course of the dialogue.

2 Deliberation Dialogues

What distinguishes deliberation dialogues from other types of dialogue in the Walton and Krabbe typology? A first characteristic arises from the focus of a deliberation, which concerns what is to be done in some situation by someone, either an individual or a group of individuals. This focus on action distinguishes deliberation dialogues from inquiry, and information-seeking dialogues, although not from persuasion and negotiation dialogues; these latter two may also be about action. Moreover, information-seeking and inquiry dialogues involve a search for the true answer to some factual question, either by one participant or by all. In such a search for truth, appeals to value assumptions (goals, preferences, etc) would be inappropriate. However, this is not the case for deliberations, where a course of action may be selected on the basis of such considerations.

A second characteristic of deliberation dialogues is the absence of a fixed initial commitment by any participant on the basic question of the dialogue. Although the participants may express individual positions about what is to be done, the discussion is a mutual one directed at reaching a joint decision over a course of action; the actions under consideration, however, need not be joint, and may indeed be enacted by others not participating in the dialogue. A deliberation dialogue is not, at least not at its outset, an attempt by one participant to persuade any of the others to agree to an initially defined proposal. In this respect, deliberation dialogues differ from persuasion dialogues. Indeed, the governing question of a deliberation dialogue may change in the course of the dialogue, as participants examine the issues associated to it.

³The agents, for example, may be acting on behalf of human principals.

A third characteristic of deliberations relates to their mutual focus. Although the participants may evaluate proposed courses of actions according to different standards or criteria, these differences are not with respect to personal interests which they seek to accommodate in the resulting decision. In this respect, a deliberation dialogue differs from a negotiation dialogue, which concerns the division of some scarce resource between competing allocations, and so must deal with reconciling potentially competing interests. In a negotiation, for example, it may be deleterious for a participant to share its information and preferences with others. But a sharing strategy should behoove participants in a deliberation; to the extent that agents are unwilling to share information or preferences, we would define their discussion to be a negotiation and not a deliberation.

These last two characteristics lead to an important observation about deliberation dialogues. An action-option which is optimal for the group when considered as a whole may be seen as sub-optimal from the perspective of each of the participants to the deliberation. This could be because a demonstration of optimality requires more information than is held by any one participant at the start of the dialogue, or because individual participants do not consider all the relevant criteria for assessment.⁴ Similarly, an option for which the group has a compelling argument may be such that no one participant, on his or her own, has such an argument; only by pooling information or resources is the group able to construct a winning argument for the option. This characteristic means that an assumption of an individual sincerity condition on agent utterances (e.g., in the FIPA Agent Communications Language ACL [21]) may not be appropriate: with this condition the optimal option would never be proposed if no one participant has, on its own, a compelling argument for it. Moreover, real-life deliberations often benefit from whimsical or apparently-random proposals, which lead participants to discuss creative (“*off-the-wall*”) alternatives.

How do dialogues commence and proceed? Information-seeking dialogues, persuasions and inquiries each commence with a question or a statement by a participant and proceed by means of responses from other participants. Likewise, negotiation dialogues arise when a resource needs to be divided, and they can commence with a proposal by a participant to divide the resource in some manner, perhaps optimally for that participant. The negotiation will then proceed via responses to this proposal, including counter-proposals, and these responses, in the best case, converge on a mutually acceptable settlement. This is how auction and economic negotiation mechanisms, such as the monotonic concession protocol [71, 73], are conducted; one may view these as protocols for negotiation dialogues with limitations on the nature and content of the permitted utterances.

A deliberation dialogue arises with a need for action in some circumstance. In general human discourse, this need may be initially expressed in governing questions which are quite open-ended, as in, *Where shall we go for dinner this evening?* or *How should we respond to the prospect of global warming?* Proposals for actions to address the expressed need may only arise late in a dialogue, after discussion on the governing question, and discussion on what considerations are relevant to its resolution. When possible courses of action are proposed, they may be evaluated on a large number of attributes, including: their direct or indirect costs and benefits; their opportunity costs;

⁴For example, as William Rehg has noted [67], one benefit of public discussion of proposed Governmental actions is that participants to the discussion learn about the consequences of action-options for others of which they were not, or even could not have been, previously aware. For this reason, decision processes which incorporate public discussion may produce better quality outcomes than those which do not, as argued in [18].

their consequences; their practical feasibility; their ethical, moral or legal implications; their resourcing implications; their likelihood of realization or of success; their conformance with other goals or strategies; their timing, duration or location; etc. Negotiations over multi-attribute outcomes share the characteristic of multi-dimensionality with deliberations.

To achieve resolution of a deliberation dialogue, one or more participants must make a proposal for an appropriate course of action. But where do such proposals for action arise? And how do the participants know when they have identified all the possible alternatives, or at least all those alternatives worth considering? These are not easy questions, for human or for machine deliberators.

3 A Formal Model of Deliberations

Guided by the considerations of the previous section, we now present a formal, high-level model for deliberation dialogues. Our work adopts a similar structure to the idealized, five-stage model for negotiation dialogues proposed by Joris Hulstijn [36].⁵ We also draw on a domain-specific decision theory, the retroflexive argumentation model for non-deductive argument of Harald Wohlrapp [84]. This model talks of a matter-in-question, equivalent to a governing question or a proposal for action, being considered from a number of different *frames* or *perspectives*; we use the latter term, to avoid confusion with Reed's *Dialogue Frames* [66]. As mentioned above, perspectives may be factors such as moral implications, opportunity costs, etc. An argument for or against a particular option is a partial understanding of that option from one or more, but rarely all, perspectives. Having heard an argument for or against an option, Wohlrapp argues, one proceeds by re-examining the underlying assumptions or modifying the action proposal, in the light of that argument. Thus, an argument against a law permitting euthanasia may be that such practices are open to abuse of ill patients by malicious relatives. A retroflexive response to this argument is to modify the proposed law by adding restrictions which inhibit or preclude such abuses, such as a requirement that the patient be of sound mind and give prior consent to the act of euthanasia.

With Wohlrapp's model in mind, we assume that the subject-matter of dialogues can be represented in a symbolic language, with sentences and sentential functions denoted by lower-case Roman letters, e.g. p, q, \dots . We define the following types of sentences:

Actions: An action is a sentence representing a deed or an act (possibly a speech act) which may be undertaken or recommended as a result of the deliberation dialogue. The purpose of the deliberation dialogue is to decide on an answer to the governing question, which will be some (course of) action. Possible actions are also called *action-options*.

Goals: A goal is a sentence representing a future world state (external to the dialogue), possibly arising following execution of one or more actions and desired by one or more participants. Goals express the purpose(s) for which actions are being considered in the dialogue.

Constraints: A constraint is a sentence expressing some limitation on the space of possible actions.

⁵Hulstijn calls these negotiation dialogues *Transactions*.

Perspectives: A perspective is a sentence representing a criterion by which a potential action may be evaluated by a participant.

Facts: A fact is a sentence expressing some possible state of affairs in the world external to the dialogue.

Evaluations: An evaluation is a sentence expressing an assessment of a possible action with respect to a goal, constraint or perspective.

These types are mutually exclusive. With these elements defined, we now present a formal model of the dialogue itself, a model which consists of eight stages:

Open: Opening of the deliberation dialogue, and the raising of a governing question about what is to be done.

Inform: Discussion of: (a) desirable goals; (b) any constraints on the possible actions which may be considered; (c) perspectives by which proposals may be evaluated; and (d) any premises (facts) relevant to this evaluation.

Propose: Suggesting of possible action-options appropriate to the governing question.

Consider: Commenting on proposals from various perspectives.

Revise: Revising of: (a) goals, (b) constraints, (c) perspectives, and/or (d) action-options in the light of the comments presented; and the undertaking of any information-gathering or fact-checking required for resolution. (Note that other types of dialogues, such as information seeking or persuasion, may be embedded in the deliberation dialogue at this stage.)

Recommend: Recommending an option for action, and acceptance or non-acceptance of this recommendation by each participant.

Confirm: Confirming acceptance of a recommended option by each participant. We have assumed that all participants must confirm their acceptance of a recommended option for normal termination.

Close: Closing of the deliberation dialogue.

This is a model of an ideal dialogue. The stages may occur in any order, and may be entered by participants as frequently as desired, subject only to the following constraints:

- The first stage in every dialogue is the **Open** stage. Once a second participant enters the dialogue, the dialogue is said to be *open*.
- The **Open** stage in any deliberation dialogue may occur only once in *that* dialogue. All other stages may occur more than once. One deliberation dialogue may be embedded in another, so that successive open stages, each belonging to a different deliberation dialogue, may occur.
- The only stages which must occur in every dialogue which terminates normally are **Open** and **Close**.
- At least one instance of the **Inform** stage must precede the first instance of every other stage, excepting **Open** and **Close**.

- At least one instance of the **Propose** stage must precede the first instance of the **Consider, Revise, Recommend** and **Confirm** stages.
- At least one instance of the **Consider** stage must precede the first instance of the **Revise** stage.
- The **Confirm** stage can only be entered following an instance of a **Recommend** stage.
- Upon successful completion of an instance of the **Confirm** stage, the dialogue must enter the **Close** stage.
- The last stage in every dialogue which terminates normally is the **Close** stage.
- Subject only to the constraints expressed in these rules and constraints expressed in the locution-combination rules (articulated below), participants may enter any stage from within any other stage at any time.

Some comments are appropriate on the rules constraining the order of stages. Firstly, the participants may enter a **Close** stage more than once in a particular dialogue. As the locution rules below will demonstrate, participants are required to indicate publicly that they wish to leave the dialogue. Whenever a participant does this, the dialogue enters a **Close** stage. However, the **Close** stage remains unconcluded, and the dialogue remains *open*, as long as there are at least two participants who wish to continue speaking. It is therefore possible for the **Close** stage, as with all the other stages except the **Open** stage, to be entered multiple times in any one dialogue.

Secondly, we have assumed for simplicity in this initial model that unanimity of the participants is required for a decision on a course of action to be made. It would be quite possible for the participants to adopt a different procedure for confirmation, such as majority voting or consensus procedures, as modeled formally in [37]. If alternative voting procedures were to be adopted, it would be useful to announce the results of any votes formally to the participants, with a statement of the group's decision, just as the minutes of human meetings usually record these. For this reason, we have demarcated a separate stage, **Confirm**, to record final commitments to action. In addition, the requirement that participants once again assert their endorsement for a particular course of action reinforces their commitment to this course as the group's decision. Once all participants have confirmed their acceptance of a recommended action, the dialogue must end, and any further discussion relevant to the same governing question can only occur by commencement of a new deliberation dialogue.

Apart from the constraints listed here, the order of stages is not fixed and participants may return to different stages multiple times in any one dialogue. Thus, a dialogue undertaken according to this model may cycle repeatedly through these stages, just as human dialogues do. In this way, the protocol here gives practical effect to Wohlrapp's model of retroflexive argumentation. The model is also quite general; we have not specified the nature of the governing questions, goals, constraints, facts, action-options, perspectives or evaluations. Nor have we specified here any particular mechanisms for producing, revising or accepting action-options.⁶

⁶Wohlrapp's model of retroflexive argumentation and the formalization of it presented here have some similarities with Imre Lakatos' theory of mathematical discovery [44]. According to Lakatos, mathematicians work by proposing statements they believe may be theorems and then seeking proofs for these. In doing so, a counter-example to the proposed theorem may be found, which leads the mathematician to modify the proposal. A new attempt at seeking a proof is then undertaken, with the process repeated until such time as

4 Locutions for a Deliberation Dialogue Protocol

4.1 Introduction

We now articulate the locutions of a formal dialogue game which enables a deliberation dialogue to be conducted according to the eight-stage model just presented. Dialogue games are interactions between two or more participants who “move” by uttering locutions, according to certain rules. They were first studied by Aristotle [7] and have been used in modern philosophy to understand fallacious arguments [33, 49] and to provide a game-theoretic semantics for formal logical systems [46]. Over the last decade they have been applied in various areas of computer science and artificial intelligence: for the specification of software systems with multiple stakeholders [17]; for the design of man-machine interfaces [8, 36]; for the analysis of complex human reasoning [65]; and for the design of interaction protocols for autonomous software agents [4, 13, 52].⁷

A dialogue game may be specified by listing the legal locutions, together with the rules which govern their use, and the commencement and termination of dialogues [54]. In this Section, we present only the locutions, and not also the necessary pre-conditions for, and the consequences of, their utterance; these conditions are presented in detail in the Appendix. We continue to assume that the subject-matter of dialogues can be represented in a sentential language by lower-case Roman letters, and we denote participating agents by P_1, P_2 , etc. Since the work of Charles Hamblin [33], it has been standard to define a public store, called a *commitment store*, for each participant in a dialogue game. We denote the store of agent P_i by $CS(P_i)$. This store contains the sentences to which the participant is publicly committed, and the rules of the dialogue game may also define the circumstances under which sentences may be inserted or deleted from the commitment stores. The store for an agent contains the various sentences which that agent has publicly asserted or preferences he or she has declared; entries in the store are thus of two forms: (a) 2-tuples of the form $(type, t)$, where t is a valid sentence instance of type $type$, with $type \in \{goal, constraint, perspective, fact, action, evaluation\}$; and (b) 3-tuples of the form $(prefer, a, b)$, where a and b are action sentences. Each store can be viewed by all participants, but only a participant’s own utterances lead to insertions into its associated store.⁸

4.2 Locutions

With this introduction, we are able to articulate the permissible locutions in the dialogue game:

open_dialogue($P_i, q?$): Participant P_i proposes the opening of a deliberation dialogue to consider the governing question $q?$, where q is a sentence of type *action*, or a sentential function whose values are of type *action* (possibly conjoined with a sentence that exactly one sequence of objects satisfies the function). A dialogue may only commence with this move.

enter_dialogue($P_j, q?$): Participant P_j indicates a willingness to join a deliberation dialogue to consider the governing question $q?$ All intending participants other

a theorem is identified for which a proof can be found. The theories of Lakatos and Wohlrapp may be seen as describing (in part) arguments which proceed by *precization*, in the terminology of Arne Naess [56].

⁷Dialogue games have also been used in computational linguistics to model natural language conversations, e.g., [45], although this work appears unaware of their far longer use in philosophy.

⁸In other words, the Commitment Stores are private-write and public-read data stores.

than the mover of **open_dialogue(.)** must announce their participation with this move. Note that neither the **open_dialogue(.)** nor the **enter_dialogue(.)** move implies that the speaker accepts that $q?$ is the most appropriate governing question, only that he or she is willing to enter into a discussion about it at this time.

propose($P_i, type, t$): Participant P_i proposes sentence t as a valid instance of type $type$, where $type \in \{ goal, constraint, perspective, fact, action, evaluation \}$.

assert($P_i, type, t$): Participant P_i asserts sentence t as a valid instance of type $type$, where $type \in \{ goal, constraint, perspective, fact, action, evaluation \}$. This is a stronger locution than **propose(.)**, and results in the tuple $(type, t)$ being inserted into $CS(P_i)$, the Commitment Store of P_i . In the case where the utterance here is **assert**($P_i, action, t$) and follows an utterance of **move**($P_j, action, t$), for some other agent P_j , then this utterance also removes any earlier entry in the Commitment Store $CS(P_i)$ of the form $(action, s)$.

prefer(P_i, a, b): Participant P_i indicates a preference for action-option a over action-option b . This locution can only be uttered following utterance (possibly by other participants) of **assert**($P_j, evaluation, e$) locutions of at least two evaluations e , one of which has a as its first argument, and one b . This combination rule ensures that preferences expressed in the dialogue are grounded in an evaluation of each action-option according to some proposed goal, constraint or perspective, and thus contestable. This locution inserts $(prefer, a, b)$ into $CS(P_i)$, the Commitment Store of P_i .

ask_justify($P_j, P_i, type, t$): Participant P_j asks participant P_i to provide a justification of sentence t of type $type$, where $t \in CS(P_i)$.

move($P_i, action, a$): Participant P_i proposes that each participant pronounce on whether they assert sentence a as the action to be decided upon by the group. This locution inserts $(action, a)$ into $CS(P_i)$, and removes any earlier entry in the Commitment Store of the form $(action, b)$.⁹

reject($P_j, action, a$): Participant P_j rejects the assertion of sentence a as the action to be decided upon by the group. If the Commitment Store $CS(P_i)$ of participant P_j contains $(action, a)$ prior to this utterance, then it will be removed upon utterance.

retract($P_j, locution$): Participant P_j expresses a retraction of a previous locution, $locution$, where $locution$ is one of three possible utterances: **assert**($P_j, type, t$) or **move**($P_j, action, a$) or **prefer**(P_j, a, b) locution. The retraction locution deletes the entry from $CS(P_j)$ which had been inserted by $locution$.

withdraw_dialogue($P_i, q?$): Participant P_i announces her withdrawal from the deliberation dialogue to consider the governing question $q?$.

The locution **ask_justify**($P_j, P_i, type, t$) is a request by participant P_j of participant P_i , seeking justification from P_i for the assertion that sentence t is a valid instance of type $type$. Following this, P_i must either retract the sentence t or shift into an embedded persuasion dialogue in which P_i seeks to persuade P_j that sentence t is such a valid

⁹The name of this locution derives from the standard terminology of human meeting procedures, for example, *Robert's Rules of Order* [70, Section 4(1), p. 31].

instance. One could model such a persuasion dialogue with a formal dialogue-game framework consistent with the deliberation framework presented here, drawing, for example, on the dialogue game models of persuasion proposed by Walton and Krabbe [82] or by Prakken [65].

The **move(.)** locution requests that participants who agree with a particular action being decided upon by the group should utter an **assert(.)** locution with respect to this action. To communicate rejection of the proposed action made in a **move(.)** locution, a participant must utter a **reject(.)** locution with respect to the proposed action. Because in this model we have assumed unanimity of decision-making, the **Recommend** stage is only concluded successfully, and hence the dialogue only proceeds to the **Confirm** stage, in the case when all participants respond to the **move(.)** locution with the appropriate **assert(.)** locution.

4.3 Deliberation Dialogues

We intend that the dialogue game protocol defined in sub-section 4.2 should implement the eight-stage model for deliberation dialogues proposed in Section 3. To achieve this, we need to demonstrate that each of the eight stages of the formal model of deliberation dialogues can be executed by judicious choice of these locutions. We show this by considering each stage in turn:

- The **Open** stage of a dialogue begins with the locution **open_dialogue**($P_i, q?$) and at least one utterance of **enter_dialogue**($P_j, q?$), for P_j and P_i distinct participants.
- The **Inform** stage consists of utterances of **propose(.)**, **assert(.)**, **retract(.)** and **ask_justify(.)** for some or all of the types *goal*, *constraint*, *perspective*, and *fact*.
- The **Propose** stage consists of one or more utterances of **propose**($P_i, action, t$).
- The **Consider** stage consists of utterances of locutions **assert**($P_i, evaluation, e$), **prefer**(P_j, a, b) and **ask_justify(.)**.
- In the **Revise** stage, a revision $a2$ to an action $a1$ proposed earlier may be proposed by means of the locution **propose**($P_i, action, a2$). Similarly, the locution **propose**($P_i, type, t2$) may be used to propose a revision $t2$ to a prior proposal $t1$, for any of the types *goal*, *constraint*, *perspective*, *evaluation*, and *fact*.
- The **Recommend** stage consists of an execution of **move**($P_i, action, a$), followed by utterances of **assert**($P_j, action, a$) or **reject**($P_j, action, a$), for P_j and P_i distinct participants.
- The **Confirm** stage only occurs following a **Recommend** stage where all participants have indicated acceptance of the recommended action-option. It then consists of the utterance of **assert**($P_j, action, a$) by every participant P_j , including the speaker of **move**($P_i, action, a$).
- The **Close** stage occurs whenever a participant utters **withdraw_dialogue**($P_i, q?$). A dialogue closes only when there remain two participants who have not uttered this locution, and one of them does so.

Thus, the dialogue game protocol defined in the previous sub-section enables participants to an interaction to undertake a deliberation dialogue which conforms to the model proposed in Section 3. Essentially what we have done here is show that the definitions of the dialogue game locutions are consistent with the definitions of the eight stages given earlier.

We note that nothing in our protocol requires all dialogues to terminate, nor that all dialogues have substantive meaning. Thus, for example, one participant could initiate a dialogue with an **open_dialogue(.)** utterance followed by **enter_dialogue(.)** utterance by another participant, only for the dialogue to then go silent. How long the two participants wait before speaking again or departing (if ever), is a matter for them, not the protocol.

4.4 Commitments

Some comments on our notion of commitments are in order here, as this concept has different connotations for different authors. For Hamblin [33, p. 257], commitment is purely dialectical, expressing only a willingness by the participant who has made the commitment to defend the commitment if it is attacked; in particular, commitments need not correspond to the participant's real beliefs. For Walton and Krabbe [82, Chapter 1], however, commitments are obligations to (execute, incur or maintain) a course of action. These actions may be utterances in a dialogue, as when a speaker is forced to defend a statement he has asserted against attack from others; for these authors, propositional commitment is a special case of action commitments [82, p. 23]. For Munindar Singh and Marco Colombetti and their colleagues, *social commitments* are an expression of wider inter-personal, social, business or legal relationships between the participants, and utterances in a dialogue are a means by which these relationships may be manipulated or modified [10, 79].¹⁰ We adopt Hamblin's understanding of commitments as representing dialectical obligations; we do not require that commitments correspond to the participants' real beliefs, preferences or intentions at the time of the dialogue, nor that they indicate an intention to undertake some actions outside the world of and subsequent to the dialogue. Rather they represent statements to which a speaker is committed to defend, if and when attacked inside the dialogue by other participants. The main purpose of Commitment Stores in our framework, then, is to track these dialectical obligations of the participants.

An important motivation for our work is the development of protocols which enable *rational* interaction between participants, where *rational* is used in the minimal sense of giving and receiving of reasons for statements [38]. Thus, our constraint that preferences between actions only be expressed for actions which have already been evaluated is intended to ensure that participant preferences are grounded in some reason, rather than simply being assumed to exist *ab initio*.¹¹ By supporting rational interaction, an interaction mechanism provides for the participants to change their beliefs, preferences or intentions in the light of information or arguments received from other participants. Political theorists use the term *self-transformation* to refer to such changes which participants may experience in the course of a discussion [23], and, as will be shown in Section 6.2 below, our protocol enables this. Because of this, we permit participants to

¹⁰In the multi-agent systems literature, the word *commitments* can also refer to an agent's persistent intentions. Singh argues [78] that this notion is distinct from the social commitments described here, and that neither can be derived from the other.

¹¹Our approach is consistent with recent approaches to practical reasoning by philosophers, such as John Searle [74], and economists, such as Amartya Sen [75].

make utterances which contradict their own prior utterances, or the utterances of others, and to retract prior utterances. For example, a participant may express a preference for action-option a over option b , but then vote for b — via an **assert**($P_i, action, b$) utterance — when another participant P_j utters **move**($P_j, action, b$).

As can be seen from inspection of the the axiomatic semantics given in the Appendix, the protocol rules governing the contents of participant Commitment Stores are few. Only the utterance of three locutions — **assert**(.), **prefer**(.) and **move**(.) — result in new entries to the speaker’s Commitment Store, while four — **assert**(., $action$, .), **move**(.), **reject**(.) and **retract**(.) — may cause deletions. Interactions between multiple commitments in one speaker’s Commitment Store are ignored, except when the speaker utters **move**(.) or **assert**(., $action$, .) following a **move**(.) utterance. In other words, only when a deliberation dialogue is in a **Recommend** stage do we consider consistency of a speaker’s commitments important, and then only for assertion of actions. Moreover, the protocol is not concerned with the consistency of the contents of the Commitment Stores of two or more participants. Thus, one participant may assert two action options and another participant express a preference for one option over the other; in this case, the preference commitment created by the second speaker remains in its Commitment Store, even if the first speaker subsequently retracts one or both of its earlier assertions. We believe this liberal approach is necessary for a protocol for open agent systems, where participants may have very different goals, desires and intentions, and may have been created by different agent design teams.

5 Example

We now consider a simplified example of a dialogue undertaken according to our deliberation dialogue protocol. In this example, the deliberation concerns what action to take regarding potential health hazards from the use of cellular phones. The dialogue utterances are numbered sequentially from **U1**, and each is annotated.

U1: open_dialogue($P_1, Do\ what\ about\ mobile\ phone\ health\ risk?$)

This move is the first move in the **Open** stage of the dialogue.

U2: enter_dialogue($P_2, Do\ what\ about\ mobile\ phone\ health\ risk?$)

With the entry of a second participant, the dialogue may be said to commence.

U3: enter_dialogue($P_3, Do\ what\ about\ mobile\ phone\ health\ risk?$)

A third participant also enters the dialogue.

U4: propose($P_2, perspective, degree\ of\ risk$)

Participant P_2 proposes that *degree of risk* should be a perspective from which to consider the question. With this move, the dialogue enters an **Inform** stage.

U5: propose($P_3, perspective, economic\ cost$)

Participant P_3 proposes that *economic cost* should be a perspective from which to consider the question.

U6: propose($P_1, action, prohibit\ sale\ of\ phones$)

Participant P_1 proposes *prohibition of sale of phones* as an action-option. With this move, the dialogue enters a **Propose** stage.

U7: propose(P_3 , *action, do nothing*)

Participant P_3 proposes *doing nothing* as an action-option.

U8: assert(P_1 , *evaluation, prohibit sale from a degree of risk perspective is lowest risk*)

Participant P_1 asserts that from the perspective of the degree of risk, prohibiting the sale of phones is the lowest risk action-option possible. With this move, the dialogue enters a **Consider** stage.

U9: assert(P_3 , *evaluation, prohibit sale from an economic cost perspective is high-cost*)

Participant P_3 asserts that from the perspective of economic cost, prohibiting sale is a high-cost option.

U10: propose(P_1 , *action, limit usage*)

Participant P_1 proposes limiting usage as an action-option, thus responding retroflexively to the previous two **assert**(P_i , *evaluation, e*) locutions. With this move, the dialogue enters a **Revise** stage.

U11: propose(P_2 , *perspective, feasibility*)

Participant P_2 proposes feasibility as a perspective from which to consider the question. With this move, the dialogue enters another **Inform** stage.

U12: assert(P_2 , *evaluation, limit usage from a feasibility perspective is impractical*)

Participant P_2 asserts that from the perspective of feasibility, limiting usage is not practical. With this move, the dialogue enters another **Consider** stage.

U13: prefer(P_1 , *prohibit sale, limit usage*)

Participant P_1 expresses a preference for the option of prohibiting the sale of phones over limiting their usage. The utterance is valid at this point, since each action-option has appeared as the first argument in a sentence e of type *evaluation* in an **assert**(P_i , *evaluation, e*) locution.

⋮

U25: withdraw_dialogue(P_2 , *Do what about mobile phone health risk?*)

One participant, the second to enter the dialogue, announces its departure from the dialogue. The dialogue may continue until one of the other two participants withdraws.

U26: move(P_1 , *action, limit usage*)

One participant seeks to have the remaining participants vote on the action-option of limiting phone usage.

U27: *reject*(P_3 , *action*, *limit usage*)

The other remaining participant votes against this. Whether or not this would defeat the motion moved by Participant P_1 would depend on the decision-making rules of the forum.¹²

⋮

U35: *withdraw_dialogue*(P_3 , *Do what about mobile phone health risk?*)

A second participant announces its departure from the dialogue, leaving just one participant remaining. This utterance therefore ends the dialogue.

This example, although very simple, illustrates the usage of selected locutions, and demonstrates the way in which a dialogue may move between stages as it proceeds. Such cycling between stages is commonplace in human deliberations, where comments, arguments or preferences uttered by one participant are likely to provoke others to think of new goals, constraints, facts, perspectives or action-options.

6 Assessment of the DDF Protocol

How may we assess the Deliberation Dialogue Framework model of a deliberation dialogue and the associated dialogue game protocol? In other words, is this a good protocol or not? There are several ways to approach this issue, and in the next three subsections we consider three of these. Firstly, we compare our protocol with actual human deliberation dialogues; secondly, we consider the DDF protocol from the perspective of the deliberation processes it implements; and thirdly, we consider the outcomes, if any, which deliberation dialogues conducted under the DDF protocol achieve.

6.1 Human Dialogues

Although we intend our framework to support only interactions between computational entities, its motivation and structure derive from consideration of human deliberation dialogues. Therefore, one approach to the assessment of the framework would be to ask whether it provides a good model of actual human deliberation dialogues. However, in doing so, it is important to realize that our framework is an idealization of human dialogues in at least two respects. Firstly, the framework presupposes cognitive abilities on the part of the participants which probably exceed those of most human deliberators, for instance, maintaining conformity with the pre-conditions of locution utterance; adhering to the rules regarding the order of dialogue stages; and keeping track of the contents of commitment stores of all participants as the discussion proceeds. Secondly, actual human dialogues undoubtedly contain more irrelevancies, rigidities, interruptions, and transitions to other types of dialogues which are not functionally embedded, than does our framework. Given this reality, there are two features of actual human dialogues which could lead us to revise our framework: the absence of constructive components of a type of move presently included in our framework, or the presence of constructive moves in human dialogues which our framework does not accommodate.

¹²For example, the rules may provide for differential weighting of votes.

On the the first of these, most readers will have experienced human deliberation dialogues in which instances of the various locutions we have proposed have been used. For instance, if a group of friends decide to have dinner together and jointly seek to agree on a restaurant, often one or more participants will make proposals on which restaurant to select. Some may even propose that criteria for selection be established first, for example, that the restaurant be within walking distance, or provide food of a certain cuisine, or be within a certain price range, etc. Similarly, once suggested, such proposals may be subject to requests for justification, statements of preference, or suggestions that a particular option be selected. In the case where there are many dinner participants having conflicting preferences, there may even be a vote taken to make the final restaurant selection. Although everyday human deliberation dialogues are typically not as formal or as structured as is our framework, we believe they typically incorporate some or all of the ideal stages and constructive locutions we have identified.

What of more important human deliberation dialogues, such as those to decide great matters of state or of public policy? While perhaps a majority of such decisions involve deliberation dialogues, we have found few examples giving full accounts or transcripts of the dialogues themselves. Typical studies of Governmental decision-making, such as [34], an account of the decision-making processes in seven public policy domains in post-Independence Zimbabwe, reconstruct the major options considered and the arguments for and against them, but not in a sufficiently detailed manner to reveal the structure of deliberation dialogues used to reach decisions. However, we have found two examples of human deliberation dialogues in public policy domains from which we may infer the structure of these dialogues, with the aim of determining whether our framework requires revision.

The first example concerns the discussions within the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) at the time of the pro-democracy student demonstrations in the Northern spring and summer of 1989. Here the deliberation dialogues concerned what to do, if anything, about the demonstrations. In the end, the CCP leadership decided to impose martial law, and order soldiers from the Chinese People's Liberation Army to remove the demonstrators forcibly, an action which led to killings of demonstrators in Tiananmen Square in Beijing and elsewhere in China in June 1989. Recently, documents purporting to be the minutes of some of the relevant CCP meetings have been smuggled out of China and published [58]. Although their authenticity has not been verified, three eminent Western scholars of Chinese politics found in them nothing to indicate that they were not genuine [58].

However, as instances of deliberation dialogues, these records are not very informative. The relative political power of the participants appears to have greatly influenced what they say to one another, and there is little substantive discussion of the consequences of alternative courses of action, or their relative advantages and disadvantages. For such a major decision, there is (at least in these documents) remarkably little debate or substantive analysis. For example, once Deng Xiaopeng, the most powerful participant in the discussions, had decided upon martial law, all but two of the other participants, the brave Zhao Ziyang and Hu Qili, also supported it. The nature of this support appears to have mostly been political point-scoring and scape-goating, primarily directed against Zhao; in reading these transcripts, one has the impression that the speakers expressing such views were articulating positions they already knew Deng to support. Moreover, these dialogues do not provide an example of retroflexive argumentation, because the one proposal considered, imposing martial law, is not modified in the light of the few objections raised to it. Because our framework is intended to be a general one, we have not explicitly modeled any power relationships between

the participants. This would be possible, and has, indeed, been done in other work on modeling coordination and negotiation in AI, e.g., in [60].

The participants in a second example of human deliberation dialogues in public policy domains were more equal than the CCP leadership appears to have been during the Tiananmen crisis. This example involved the discussions in the British War Cabinet in May 1940, when, following the appointment of Winston Churchill as Prime Minister, the members of the War Cabinet discussed various proposals regarding the conduct of the war with Germany [48]. One of the proposals considered was to seek to negotiate a peace agreement with Germany, and thus end the conflict quickly. Some of the participants, notably Churchill, had previously been strongly opposed to this option, but (according to the reconstruction by John Lukacs in [48]), Churchill felt his political support at this time within the Parliamentary Conservative Party and within the Cabinet was not strong. He therefore (according to Lukacs) pretended to entertain the proposal seriously, so as to strengthen his support with key Ministers and backbenchers, and so as not to provide his enemies with political ammunition against him at this time.

Feints and tactical moves such as these, while common in political deliberations, cannot easily be modeled computationally. Our framework, for instance, does not differentiate between sincere and insincere expressions of beliefs or preferences in a dialogue. Perhaps no computational framework can ever deal with this issue adequately, because any semantic requirement could always be simulated insincerely by a sufficiently-clever agent [85]. In other words, it is hard to see how a framework could represent dialogues in which statements are made to create the impression that the speaker supports a position he really does not, or to provoke other participants to reveal their true positions prematurely, so that these may be countered or rebutted, or to jockey for influence with third parties, both present and absent. All of these features are to be found in human deliberation dialogues, particularly when important public policy decisions are to be made. Even Singh's notion of a social semantics [77] — a commitment store involving a public expression of beliefs and intentions by each participant at the outset of a dialogue — will only enable statements in the subsequent dialogue to be verified for *consistency* with the expressed beliefs and intentions, not the degree of sincerity with which these beliefs and intentions are held.

In summary, this brief exploration of human deliberation dialogues has not led us to revise our framework. As mentioned above, each of the various sentence types, locutions and components found in our framework can be found in at least some human deliberation dialogues, and so our framework does not contain extraneous elements. On the other hand, although we have identified a class of dialogue moves which are not accommodated in our framework, that of feints and other insincere statements uttered for tactical reasons, we do not believe that these can be readily accommodated in any computational model.

6.2 Deliberation Process

A second approach to assessment of our framework is to measure it against normative principles for deliberation. We know of only three such sets of principles.¹³ The first set are criteria for public decision processes in environmental matters, identified by Thomas Webler, Seth Tuler and Rob Krueger [83]. These principles were derived from a statistical multi-variate factor analysis of the interview responses of participants

¹³We note in passing that evaluation of a process for dialectical argumentation against formal criteria may fail to capture informal and pragmatic features associated with its usage [68]. Because our protocol is intended for use by formally-specified computational entities, this is not of concern here.

in recent environmental public consultation exercises in the USA. The five resulting principles are pitched at a very abstract level; for example, the second principle is that the process should promote a search for common values. Although certainly useful for designers of public policy decision processes, the abstraction of these principles makes them unsuitable for assessment of our framework.

Alexy's Rules for Discourse Ethics

The second set of normative principles are Robert Alexy's rules for discourse ethics [1]. These were designed as principles for rational discussion over ethical norms between free and consenting participants, building on Jürgen Habermas' philosophy of discourse ethics [30]. Habermas sought to understand how rational, free people could engage in reasoned discussion and reach agreement over moral and ethical questions, and Alexy articulated a set of rules for such discussions [1]. We list the rules here, using Alexy's categorization, naming and numbering (apart from an initial **A** for each rule); for simplicity we use only the masculine gender.

A1. Basic Rules

- A1.1** No speaker may contradict himself.
- A1.2** Each speaker may only assert what he himself believes.
- A1.3** Each speaker who applies a predicate F to an object a , must also be prepared to apply F to any other object which is similar to a in all respects.
- A1.4** Different speakers may not use the same expression with different meanings.

A2. Rules of Reason

- A2 (General Rule of Justification):** Every speaker must justify what he asserts upon request, unless he can provide grounds which justify avoiding giving a justification.
- A2.1** Anyone who can speak may take part in discourse.
- A2.2 (a)** Anyone may render any assertion problematic.
- A2.2 (b)** Anyone may introduce any assertion into the discourse.
- A2.2 (c)** Anyone may express his opinions, wishes and needs.
- A2.3** No speaker may be prevented by constraint within or outside the discourse from making use of his rights established in 2.1 and 2.2.

A3. Rules of the Burden of Argumentation

- A3.1** Whoever wishes to treat a person A differently from a person B is obliged to justify this.
- A3.2** Whoever attacks a statement or norm that is not the object of discussion must provide a reason for doing so.
- A3.3** Whoever has put forward an argument is only committed to further arguments in the case of a counterargument.

A3.4 Whoever introduces an assertion or a statement concerning his opinions, wishes, or needs into the discourse, which as argument is not related to a previous statement, has to justify upon request why he has introduced this assertion or this statement.

A4. Forms of Argument

Under this heading, Alexy proposes six normative models for the structural form of arguments concerning ethical values and norms, forms which depend upon the reasons advanced for such values and the perceived consequences of adopting them. We do not present or discuss these here, as they are specific to arguments over ethical values.

A5. Rules of Justification

A5.1.1 Everyone must be able to accept the consequences of the rule — presupposed in his normative statements — regarding the satisfaction of the interests of each individual person even for the hypothetical case in which he finds himself in the situation of this person.

A5.1.2 The consequences of every rule for the satisfaction of the interests of each and every individual must be capable of being accepted by all.

A5.1.3 Every rule must be openly and universally teachable.

A5.2.1 The moral rules that form the basis of the moral conceptions of the speakers must be able to withstand scrutiny in a critical, historical genesis. A moral rule does not withstand such a scrutiny

- (a) if it was indeed originally justifiable rationally but in the meantime has lost its justification, or
- (b) if it was already originally not justifiable rationally and if no sufficient new reasons for it can be found.

A5.2.2 The moral rules that form the basis of the moral conceptions of the speakers must be able to withstand the scrutiny of their individual history of emergence. A moral rule does not withstand such a scrutiny if it is only accepted on the basis of conditions of socialization that are not justifiable.

A5.3 The factually given limits of realizability are to be observed.

A6. Rules of Transition

A6.1 It is possible at all times for any speaker to switch to a theoretical (empirical) discourse.

A6.2 It is possible at all times for any speaker to move to a linguistic-analytical discourse.

A6.3 It is possible at all times for any speaker to move to a discourse on discourse theory.

Habermas' theory of discourse ethics has subsequently been applied to legal and political philosophy [31, 32], and to a philosophical assessment of electronic democracy [15]. Despite these examples of wider application, however, some of Alexy's rules appear very specific to ethical discussions and not applicable to generic deliberation dialogues. For instance, *Rule 4: Forms of Argument*, consists of six normative

models for the structural form of arguments concerning ethical values and norms. Similarly specific to discourse ethics are Rules A2.1, A3.1, A5 and A6.3. The other rules have applicability to wider deliberation dialogues, and accordingly, we can assess our framework against them.

We consider each rule in turn. Rule A1.1 is not satisfied: participants using DDF may contradict themselves, as seen by examining the pre-conditions for the locutions given in the Appendix. Rule A1.2 is not satisfied: our framework is defined purely in terms of observable linguistic behaviour, and has no requirements that participants are sincere in their utterances. Moreover, because our framework does not require consistency of utterances, either from the one speaker or between multiple speakers, Rules A1.3 and A1.4 are not satisfied (respectively). It would be possible to satisfy Rule A1.4 through appropriate regimentation of the formal language used to represent the subject matter of deliberation dialogues.

Rule A2 (General Rule of Justification) is satisfied, via the **ask_justify(.)** locution. The three parts of Rule A2.2 are satisfied, by means of the **ask_justify(.)**, **assert(.)** and **prefer(.)** locutions, respectively. Rule A2.3 is satisfied within the dialogue by means of the pre-conditions of the locutions given in the Appendix. The DDF framework makes no assumptions concerning any relationship between the parties external to the dialogue, and so the framework cannot be assessed with regard to constraints on speakers imposed outside the dialogue.

Rule A3.1 is specific to ethical discussions. Rule A3.2 is not satisfied, or rather, is satisfied trivially, since participants may only attack a statement via the **ask_justify(.)** locution, which has as a pre-condition the requirement that a prior **assert(.)** locution has been uttered concerning the same statement. Rules A3.3 and A3.4 are both satisfied, by the definition of the **ask_justify(.)** locution. Rules A4 and A5 are specific to ethical discussions. Rule A6.1, A6.2 and A6.3 are satisfied: Although the types of sentences, the locutions and the combination rules in our framework are specific to deliberation dialogues, the framework permits shifts to functionally-embedded dialogues of different types, such as inquiry dialogues or persuasion dialogues. These may concern theoretical, empirical, linguistic-analytical or discourse-theoretic matters.

Summarizing this assessment, we see that the Deliberation Dialogue Framework presented in Sections 3 and 4 satisfies Alexy's rules for discourse ethics to the following extent: Rules A2, A2.2, A3.3, A3.4, A6.1, A6.2 and A6.3 are fully satisfied; Rule A2.3 is partly satisfied; and Rules A1.1, A1.2, A1.3, A1.4 and A3.2 are not satisfied. In addition, Rules A2.1, A3.1, A4, and A5 are specific to ethical discussions, and so are not applicable here. In assessing our framework against Alexy's normative rules, we note that three of his rules which are not satisfied, A1.2, A1.3 and A1.4, concern the relationship between what is uttered in the dialogue and what the speaker truly believes. As noted in the previous sub-section, our framework does not distinguish between sincere and insincere utterances, and makes no requirements that speakers express only their true beliefs or preferences.

Hitchcock's Principles for Rational Mutual Inquiry

A third set of normative principles are the Principles of Rational Mutual Inquiry developed by one of us more than a decade ago [35]. These were intended for human dialogues whose primary purpose was defined as being *"to secure rational agreement by the participants on the answer to a specified question. A subsidiary purpose, if they do not come to agree on an answer, is to secure agreement on why they have not succeeded in answering their question."* [35, p. 237]. These human dialogues are called

mutual inquiries; in terms of the typology of Walton and Krabbe [82], this definition was formulated with inquiry dialogues primarily in mind, but also covers deliberation dialogues. It is therefore appropriate to consider them as principles against which our deliberation dialogue protocol may be measured. We begin by summarizing these Principles, numbered H1 through H18; the linguistic labels are those of the original.

- H1 Externalization:** The rules should be formulated in terms of verifiable linguistic behaviour.
- H2 Dialectification:** The content and methods of dialogue should be subject to the agreement of participants, without any prior imposition.
- H3 Mutuality:** No statement becomes a commitment of a participant unless he or she specifically accepts it.
- H4 Turn-taking:** At most one person speaks at a time.
- H5 Orderliness:** One issue is raised at a time and is dealt with before proceeding to others.
- H6 Staging:** An inquiry dialogue should proceed by a series of stages, from initial clarification of the question at issue and of the methods of resolving it, through data gathering and interpretation, to formation of arguments.
- H7 Logical Pluralism:** Arguments should permit both deductive and non-deductive forms of inference.
- H8 Rule-consistency:** There should be no situation where the rules prohibit all acts, including the null act.
- H9 Semantic Openness:** The rules should not force any participant to accept any statement, even when these follow by deduction from previous statements.
- H10 Realism:** The rules must make agreement between participants a realistic possibility.
- H11 Retractability:** Participants must be free at all times to supplement, change or withdraw previous tentative commitments.¹⁴
- H12 Role reversal:** The rules should permit the responsibility for initiating suggestions to shift between participants.
- H13 Experiential Appeal:** The rules should permit direct mutual appeal to experience.
- H14 Openness:** There should be no restrictions on the content of contributions.
- H15 Tentativeness:** Participants should be free to make tentative suggestions as well as assertions.
- H16 Tracking:** The rules should make it possible to determine at any time the cumulative commitments, rights and obligations of each participant.

¹⁴This Principle may be understood as a requirement that the protocol enables *self-transformation*, in the sense of Section 4.4.

H17 Termination: There should be rules for the orderly termination of the dialogue. Hitchcock proposes that an inquiry terminate as soon as (a) a participant declares an intention to abandon it, (b) in two successive turns neither participant has a suggestion for consideration, or (c) there is agreement on the conclusion of the discussion.

H18 Allocation of Burden of Proof: The burden of proof remains with the participant who makes a suggestion, even after contestation by another Participant.

As with Alexy's rules, we can assess the DDF protocol against Hitchcock's Principles, by considering each Principle in turn. Principle H1 (Externalization) is satisfied by our protocol, as can be seen by an examination of the pre- and post-conditions of the locutions listed in the Appendix and the constraints on the order of dialogue stages given in Section 3.¹⁵ Principle H2 (Dialectification) is only partly satisfied, since we do not permit participants to change the protocol framework itself. Principle H3 (Mutuality) is satisfied, as shown by the commitment store conditions for the locution **assert(.)**. Principle H4 (Turn-taking) will be satisfied in any computational application on a sequential processor. Principle H5 (Orderliness) is satisfied to the extent that each dialogue under the protocol concerns one governing question. However, there is nothing to stop issues related to this question being considered simultaneously in a manner contrary to this Principle. The next principle, H6 (Staging), is satisfied by the phased framework presented in Section 3. Principle H7 (Logical Pluralism) is satisfied, since there are no restrictions placed on the content of the justifications participants may advance for their statements. However, embedded dialogues may restrict inferences to specific forms, such as embedded Persuasion dialogue protocols which use deductive inference. Principle H8 (Rule-consistency) is satisfied, as is shown by an examination of the post-conditions of each locution given in the Appendix.

Principle H9 (Semantic Openness) is satisfied, since no rules force a participant to accept any statement. Principle H10 (Realism) is satisfied, since the protocol readily permits participants to express their agreement to statements uttered in dialogues under it. Principle H11 (Retraceability) is satisfied up to the execution of the **Confirm** Stage, by means of the **retract(.)** locution. Utterances of acceptances in this stage can not be subsequently retracted. Principle H12 (Role reversal) is satisfied, since any participant may initiate suggestions in the dialogue. Principle H13 (Experiential Appeal) is satisfied, since participants may support their utterances in any way they wish. Principle H14 (Openness) is partly satisfied, since the contents of utterances are typed according to the types of sentences given in Section 3. However, apart from this typing, there are no restrictions on the content of contributions. Principle H15 (Tentativeness) is satisfied because the **propose(.)** locution permits participants to make tentative suggestions. Principle H16 (Tracking) is satisfied by means of the commitment stores established for each participant. Principle H17 (Termination) is satisfied by the rules governing the **Confirm** stage and the rules governing withdrawal from the dialogue. The protocol rules allow participants to withdraw at any time, and without giving reasons. Principle H18 (Allocation of Burden of Proof) is satisfied by the definition of the **ask_justify(.)** locution, which permits a participant to contest an earlier assertion by another participant, and requires that other participant to provide a justification for the earlier assertion.

¹⁵In contrast, the definition of the syntax of the Agent Communications Language (ACL) of the Foundation for Intelligent Physical Agents (FIPA), an emerging standard for agent communications, requires agents to sincerely believe statements they make in dialogues [21], thus violating this principle.

In summary, the Deliberation Dialogue Framework presented in this paper satisfies all but four of Hitchcock’s eighteen Principles of Rational Mutual Inquiry; Principles H2 (Dialectification), H5 (Orderliness), H11 (Retraceability) and H14 (Openness) are only partly satisfied. It is worth noting that there is some inconsistency within Hitchcock’s collection of Principles. Principles H5 (Orderliness), H6 (Staging) and H17 (Termination) may conflict with Principle H2 (Dialectification), since the latter gives the participants complete freedom, including the freedom to change the rules of the protocol. Essentially, this inconsistency arises because of the need to meet two desirable, but conflicting, objectives in the design of a protocol: freedom for the participants and orderliness of the resulting dialogues. By the very act of defining a protocol for dialogues, we are constraining the freedom of the participants in some way, and are imposing some structure on the interactions between them. Because we seek to define a framework within which deliberation dialogues between computational entities can occur, our task, as designers, is to strike an appropriate balance between these conflicting objectives.¹⁶ Our framework, while not maximally dialectical, is dialectical to a considerable extent, for instance, in leaving the participants free to agree on what factors to accept as relevant to the governing question, or to initiate embedded dialogues on different questions. The framework could be made more dialectical by providing for the opportunity to convene a “*loya jurga*” or “constituent assembly” to change the framework rules; such an assembly could, for example, change the requirement of unanimity of decision-making (in the definition of the **Confirm** stage given in Section 3) to a requirement that, say, only a two-thirds majority of acceptances is necessary for a decision to be adopted by the group.

6.3 Deliberation Outcomes

The previous subsection considered our Deliberation Dialogue Framework protocol from the perspective of the *processes* it implemented. We could also assess a protocol in terms of the outcomes achieved, if any, of dialogues conducted under the protocol. For example, a protocol to support an inquiry dialogue could be assessed on whether or not dialogues conducted according to the protocol succeed in finding the answer to the question motivating the dialogue. In other words, is the outcome of an inquiry dialogue the true answer to the governing question? Since some questions may be undecidable or may require considerable time or significant resources for answers to be found, a more refined measure of the protocol may be whether it leads, on average, to the truth, or whether it would do so, given infinite time and unlimited processing resources. Two of us adopted this approach to study the formal properties of a dialogue game protocol we proposed for scientific inquiry dialogues, showing that, under some conditions, the probability that a dialogue under the protocol did not converge on the truth could be bounded away from 1 [53].

In contrast to inquiry dialogues, deliberation dialogues have as their stated objective agreement on some course of action, rather than a search for truth. In this, they are similar to negotiation dialogues, where the stated objective is agreement on an action of a particular type, namely a division of a scarce resource. We mention negotiation dialogues here because this objective is shared by the auction and negotiation protocols studied in the branch of economics known as mechanism theory, and considerable

¹⁶Krabbe notes a similar conflict of design objectives in a discussion of retraction rules in dialogue games [43]. As an example, the dialogue game protocols of Amgoud and Parsons [4, 5, 6], particularly those in [63], are at the orderliness end of the freedom–orderliness spectrum.

attention has been devoted to assessment of the outcomes of these mechanisms, e.g., [64, 71, 73]. Among the usual criteria proposed are:

Maximum social welfare: Intuitively, a protocol maximizes social welfare if it ensures that any outcome maximizes the sum of the utilities of negotiation participants. If the utility of an outcome for an agent was simply defined in terms of the amount of money that the agent received in the outcome, then a protocol that maximized social welfare would maximize the *total* amount of money “paid out.”

Pareto-efficient: An outcome is *Pareto-optimal* if any other outcome leaves at least one participant worse off, as measured by the utility of the outcome. A mechanism which achieves Pareto-optimal outcomes is said to be *Pareto-efficient*.

Many auction and economic negotiation mechanisms have been studied and shown to have these properties. We know of only one study of negotiation dialogues which considers properties such as these, recent work of two of us with Michael Wooldridge [55]. This work demonstrated, under assumptions concerning the absence of time constraints and of coercion on participants, that the outcomes of negotiation dialogues between self-interested and non-malicious participants conducted according to protocols with certain properties are Pareto-optimal [55, Proposition 1].

Adopting a similar approach to assess protocols for deliberation dialogues would mean considering whether dialogues conducted according to the protocol succeed in agreeing on a course of action, and considering the quality of this agreed course. But how to judge the quality of a course of action? We are not given antecedently a set of evaluative criteria (goals, constraints, considerations, etc) in terms of which one could theoretically determine, given all the relevant factual circumstances, what is the “best” answer to the governing question. Indeed, the protocol does not require all participants to agree at any point in the discussion on the evaluative criteria to be used, and so conflicting evaluative criteria may be supported throughout a dialogue. Moreover, participants may even undertake dialogues on different governing questions, since the rules of our DDF protocol permit the initiation of embedded deliberation dialogues on new questions within a given deliberation dialogue.¹⁷

For these reasons, it seems that the best one might do is to establish *conditional* results about outcomes of dialogues using the protocol. For example, such a result might be that, given agreement by the participants to a set of evaluative criteria and a set of factual sentences, then, if the participants use the protocol, they will reach agreement on an answer to the governing question which is optimal, provided those agreed evaluative criteria and factual sentences are valid and exhaustive of matters relevant to the governing question, and provided the participants undertake the dialogue free of time- and processing- constraints, and free of coercion or duress. However, to prove this formally we believe would require a “semantic” theory of actions akin to the standard account of sentential truth initiated by Wittgenstein and Tarski. Utility theory in economics could be viewed as a semantic theory of actions, but this has restrictive assumptions which limit its applicability [25, 50]. Developing a general theory would be a much larger undertaking than could be accommodated in this paper. We therefore leave the assessment of our protocol on the basis of the outcomes of dialogues conducted under it to another time and place.

¹⁷So, although our protocol does not permit revision of the governing question within a dialogue, a similar outcome may be achieved by opening, within this first dialogue, an embedded dialogue on a new question and reaching agreement in the second dialogue, prior to returning and ending immediately the first dialogue.

7 Discussion

7.1 Contribution

This paper has presented a dialogue-game protocol, called the Deliberation Dialogue Framework (DDF) protocol, for deliberation dialogues between computational entities, with the syntax being fully specified. The protocol is intended for use in both closed and open multi-agent systems, where open systems are those permitting participation by agents not built by the design team which created the system itself. Accordingly, we have only defined the interaction protocol and not the architecture of the agents which may use it; any agent may participate (subject to the rules of the system-owner) in a dialogue under the DDF protocol, provided only that they know and follow the protocol. In addition, in the terminology of computer programming theory, e.g., [14, 81], the protocol has been given an axiomatic semantics. The DDF protocol was based on a model for deliberative reasoning taken from argumentation theory, namely Harald Wohlrapp's theory of Retroflexive Argumentation [84]. Moreover, we showed that the protocol conforms to the majority of a set of normative principles proposed for rational mutual inquiries between humans. Further work is needed to assess the quality of outcomes achieved, if any, by dialogues conducted according to the DDF protocol. In enabling participants to contribute to a joint discussion which may proceed iteratively and to view each other's commitment stores, our model has some similarities with "blackboard" architectures for intelligent systems in computer science [59].

The designer of any interaction protocol needs to define locutions and combination rules so as to strike a balance between generality and specificity of application. If the locutions and rules are too tightly defined, the protocol will not be widely applicable. Thus, for example, HTTP, the Hyper-Text Transfer Protocol used for internet exchanges, is suitable for requesting and sending information, but not for much else; its impoverished expressiveness makes it unsuitable for argument about any information requested or transmitted, and its statelessness makes it inappropriate as it stands for requests or promises of action-commitments.¹⁸ On the other hand, if the locutions and rules of the protocol are too loosely-drawn, then the protocol will lose features specific to a particular domain of application. Arguably, the Agent Communications Language ACL of FIPA [21] suffers from this defect [55]. Because there are no constraints on what may be said by a participant at any time using FIPA ACL, agent protocol designers have had to resort to additional methods to constrain utterances and to prevent cacophonous interactions. For example, designers have defined layers on top of the basic protocol for specific applications, as in the FIPA Dutch and English auction protocols [19, 20], or have defined pre-determined dialogue segments, called *conversation policies*, which can be invoked modularly, as in [22, 27].

In proposing a protocol for deliberation dialogues, we face this same challenge. If we place too many constraints on the utterances possible using our framework, we will lose generality of application: there will be some (possibly many) deliberation dialogues which cannot be undertaken using our framework. On the other hand, if we have too few constraints, then our framework would apply to many interactions which we would not recognize as deliberations. Our response to this challenge has been to define specific types of sentences (actions, goals, constraints, etc.), specific stages of

¹⁸HTTP does not track the history of requests and responses for information made using the protocol, and so cannot monitor the state of a specific request (e.g., not-yet-requested, requested-but-not-yet-fulfilled, requested-and-fulfilled-previously, requested-again, etc). Cookies were developed to overcome HTTP's lack of state.

dialogue (Open, Inform, Propose, etc.), and specific locutions (propose, assert, prefer, etc.) which we believe appropriate to deliberation dialogues. But we have not defined many rules constraining the use of these sentences, locutions and stages. For example, it would be possible to constrain assertions of action sentences by a participant to be consistent with prior assertions of constraints and/or preferences made by that participant, or even to be consistent with prior assertions of constraints or preferences made by other participants. The existence of such rules would limit the domain of applicability of the framework, since there will always be dialogues which would be recognizable as deliberations and which reach agreement, and yet do not comply with rules such as these. Moreover, making such rules part of the protocol definition also reduces the freedom of the participants to decide themselves how to conduct a particular deliberation dialogue, and thereby reduces the extent of compliance of the framework to Hitchcock's Principle H2 (Dialectification). For these two reasons, we have not included such rules as part of the definition of the framework. There is nothing, however, to prevent the DDF framework being instantiated with such rules if designers or participants so desire it.

Similarly, although we have allowed for embedded persuasion dialogues within deliberations, we have not articulated a model of persuasion dialogue to accompany the deliberation framework. Participants in a specific deliberation dialogue on a specific occasion may favor a particular model for the conduct of a persuasion dialogue; several such models have been proposed, e.g., [4, 51, 65, 80, 82]. On a different topic, or with different participants, or at a different time in the same deliberation dialogue, a different model of persuasion may be favored. Our framework is sufficiently flexible to permit this diversity. Similarly, for the same reason, we have not specified the relationships between commitments incurred in embedded dialogues and those in the main dialogue, nor the relationships between earlier and later commitments made in the one dialogue. In previous work [54], two of us presented a formalism which enables such different relationships between commitments in dialogue to be expressed, and which permits participants to an interaction to agree such relationships prior to commencement of a dialogue. Adding such expressiveness and functionality to the deliberation dialogue framework presented here would be straightforward, if required. Including it as part of the DDF definition, however, would limit the applicability of the framework.

Does our framework, then, strike an appropriate balance between generality and specificity? Our grounding of the framework in an argumentation-theoretic account of deliberative decision-making means that the framework's sentence types, dialogue stages and locutions are specific to deliberation dialogues. We have therefore constrained the framework sufficiently to preclude it being applied to just any type of dialogue. Conversely, its flexibility ensures that many different types of deliberation dialogue may be undertaken within it. The framework broadly satisfies, for instance, the principles proposed by Hitchcock for rational mutual inquiry, and many of the principles proposed by Alexy for discourses over ethical questions, as we have shown above. The comparison with political deliberations, presented in Section 6.1, however, reveals the existence of many dialogues, ostensibly deliberations, in which participants secretly pursue other objectives. Although possibly expressible in our framework, such dialogues cannot necessarily be distinguished from sincere deliberations; as we have argued, however, this feature may be true of all computational frameworks for interaction.

7.2 Related Work

Considerable research effort in AI over the last thirty years has concerned the task of designing robots so that, when given a specific goal, such as moving into the next room, they may determine a plan for achievement of this goal. Because this research, known as *AI Planning*, concerns the determination of an action or course of actions, it would seem amenable to the application of deliberation dialogues. However, the only research program known to us which combines AI Planning with models of dialogues is the *TRAINS* project [2], which constructed an intelligent computer assistant for a human rail-freight scheduler. For this project, actual human-human conversations in the specific domain were first recorded and analyzed as a basis for the design of machine-human interactions. Although the two participants in the *TRAINS* system, machine and human, discuss a course of action, and thus ostensibly engage in a deliberation dialogue, the design of the system assumes that the machine and the human-user each begin the dialogue with a privately-developed proposal for action, which they then present to one another. Each tries to persuade the other to adopt its proposal. Thus, in the terminology of Walton and Krabbe [82], their conversation is a persuasion dialogue, albeit two-way, rather than a true deliberation. In addition, the *TRAINS* system design assumes that the human user's goal is paramount, and that the machine participates in the dialogue to assist the human to find an effective plan for achievement of this goal. Thus, the model of dialogue assumes a specific relationship of inequality between the two participants. By contrast, the model of deliberation dialogue we have presented here is not limited in this way.

Other work in AI has also come close to developing a formal model of deliberation dialogues without yet doing so. The dialogue-game protocols proposed for developing collective intention by Frank Dignum and his colleagues [12, 13] assume, like the research in AI Planning, that the overall goal of the participating agents is pre-determined. Moreover, these authors assume that one agent, an *Initiator*, undertakes a persuasion dialogue to convince the others to adopt some joint intention it has adopted. Although the task is a deliberative one, the dialogue model proposed for it is not that of a deliberation. The same comment is true of other recent research in multi-agent systems. The agent interactions in the work of one of us with Carles Sierra and Nicholas Jennings [62], for example, are deliberations mixed with persuasions, negotiations and information-seeking dialogues, as noted in [4]. However, they are modeled as persuasions, with one agent uttering an argument which the recipients try to counter. Similarly, the *SharedPlans* framework of Barbara Grosz and Sarit Kraus [29], for collaborative planning between agents, assumes that agents begin their interaction with a partial plan; this framework does not fully specify the mechanisms by which this partial plan is transformed into a full plan. Luke Hunsberger and Massimo Zancanaro [37], seeking to remedy this, have articulated mechanisms to enable *Shared-Plan* participants to vote over contested elements of a possible plan. However, these mechanisms do not permit the expression of arguments for and against proposals, and so we would not call them models of deliberation dialogues. In the language of argumentation theory, e.g., [38], the inability to express reasons for statements renders these mechanisms *non-rational*. Another approach to representing deliberation interactions between autonomous agents is the work of Pietro Panzarasa, Nicholas Jennings and Timothy Norman [60], who propose a modal logic formalism to represent the mental states of, and interactions between, the participating agents. This framework, however, assumes [60, Section 8] that at least one participant begins the discussion with a suggested proposal for action; the resulting agent interaction to decide a course of action,

although termed a *negotiation* by the authors, is therefore modeled, like the *TRAINS* system, as a persuasion and not a deliberation. Moreover, this model of persuasion, which the authors call *social mental shaping*, is one based on the exercise of social relationships between agents, such as that pertaining between a manager and her subordinates in a company.¹⁹ Although such a model has wide applicability, it is not as general as the one we have presented above, which assumes nothing about the relationships between the participants; nor could social mental shaping be called an entirely *rational* model for deliberation, because essentially the only reason an agent can provide to another to adopt a proposed course of action is, “*Because I said so!*” Thus, social mental shaping may be seen to conflict with Alexy’s Rule A2.3, which prohibits constraints on the rights of participants.

Within the area of computational dialectics specifically, several computer systems have been designed to support human deliberation dialogues. The *Zeno* system, for example, of Thomas Gordon and his colleagues [26, 42], was designed to support community participation in urban planning decisions. The model of argumentation used in this work was the *IBIS* system of Rittel and Webber [69], which provides a framework for connecting topics, issues and attributes in a multi-attribute decision domain. Later systems inspired by *Zeno*, such as the *Hermes* system for computer-supported collaborative human decision-making [41] and the *Demos* system to support human debate over issues of public policy [47], also use the *IBIS* framework. This framework connects utterances in a dialogue on the basis of their meanings (with respect to some decision problem), but does not specify or constrain the dialectical obligations of the participants. If a statement uttered by a participant in the dialogue challenges a previous statement by another participant, the *IBIS* framework provides a mechanism to represent the relationship between the two, but the framework has no rules or mechanisms for requiring such a challenge to be made, or for defending the earlier statement against such a challenge, or for resolving multiple conflicting statements.²⁰ The *IBIS* framework has no rules of the form described in our dialogue game protocol which require or preclude particular types of responses when statements are uttered. (This is not to say that our protocol constrains every locution, only that it constrains some.) The same comment is also true of various systems using spatial representations of statements and their relationships in computer-supported human dialogues, as in [11, 57]. The resulting systems are thus capable of supporting human dialogues which are more free-wheeling than the agent dialogues our model supports, but, because of the absence of rules specifying dialectical obligations, we do not believe that any of these systems incorporates a formal model of deliberation dialogues. This is true even though *Hermes*, for example, allows participants to discover, by clicking on a discourse item, what actions they are permitted.

Finally, Nikos Karacapilidis and Pavlos Moraitis have recently proposed a framework for automated software agent dialogues in e-commerce domains [40]. This framework is more general than ours, in that it enables other types of dialogue, for example, negotiations and persuasions, to be conducted by the participating agents, and allows these to be embedded within one another. For deliberation dialogues, however, the framework we present here is more expressive than their framework, as the authors indicate in [39].

¹⁹Such relationships are readily captured in preference-based argumentation systems, such as [5].

²⁰In the three systems mentioned, this task is left to a human mediator, possibly assisted by computer summarization.

7.3 Future research

We are exploring a number of extensions of this work. Firstly, we seek to model and automate more general classes of deliberation dialogue. For example, many human deliberations exhibit strong disagreement between the participants over the relevance and importance of different perspectives. Our dialogue-game model may be extended to allow for similar arguments between agents over these. Secondly, we plan to enable discussion over confirmation procedures, so that, for example, majority or plurality voting may be used instead of the unanimity now required in the **Confirm** stage. If a group of agents were to engage regularly in deliberation dialogues using the same decision-procedures, these procedural discussions would not need to be undertaken in each dialogue but could be assumed constant. Systems for agent interactions with such pre-determined rules of encounter have been called *Institutions* in the AI literature, e.g., [76]. Thirdly, our explicit typing of sentences (into facts, goals, constraints, etc) may facilitate the mathematical representation of dialogues under this model by means of the λ -calculus [9], and thus the possible development of a denotational semantics for the protocol using enriched category theory, as has been achieved for monolectical argumentation in [3].

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8 Appendix: Axiomatic Semantics

In this appendix, we define the pre-conditions for the legal utterance of locutions, and the post-conditions which occur upon their utterances, for each of the locutions of the Deliberation Dialogue Framework protocol presented in Section 4. Such a presentation in terms of pre- and post-conditions is commonly known in AI as a *STRIPS-like* notation, following [16]. Within the theory of computer programming languages it is also called an *axiomatic semantics* for the language [14, 81].

L1: The `open_dialogue(.)` locution:

Locution: `open_dialogue($P_i, q?$)`, where q is a sentence of type *action* or a sentential function whose values are of type *action* (possibly conjoined with the sentence that exactly one sequence of objects satisfies the function).

Preconditions: There must have been no prior utterance of the locution `open_dialogue($P_j, q?$)` by any participant P_j within the dialogue.

Meaning: Participant P_i proposes the opening of a deliberation dialogue to consider the governing question $q?$, where q is a sentence of type *action*, or a sentential function whose values are of type *action* (possibly conjoined

with the sentence that exactly one sequence of objects satisfies the function). A dialogue may only commence with this move.

Response: No response required. Other intending participants may respond with the **enter_dialogue(.)** locution.

Commitment Store Update: No effects.

L2: The **enter_dialogue(.)** locution:

Locution: **enter_dialogue**($P_i, q?$), where q is a sentence of type *action* or a sentential function whose values are of type *action* (possibly conjoined with the sentence that exactly one sequence of objects satisfies the function).

Preconditions: A participant P_j , where P_i and P_j are distinct, must previously have uttered the locution **open_dialogue**($P_j, q?$).

Meaning: Intending participant P_j indicates a willingness to join a deliberation dialogue to consider the governing question $q?$, where q is a sentence of type *action* or a sentential function whose values are of type *action* (possibly conjoined with the sentence that exactly one sequence of objects satisfies the function). All intending participants other than the speaker of **open_dialogue(.)** must announce their participation with this move.

Response: No response required. This locution is a pre-condition for all locutions other than **open_dialogue(.)**, i.e., an intending speaker P_k of any other locution must have previously uttered **enter_dialogue**($P_k, q?$). As soon as one participant has uttered the **enter_dialogue**($P_j, q?$) locution, the dialogue is said to be *Open*.

Commitment Store Update: No effects.

Since all the locutions listed below have a common precondition, namely that the speaker P_j has previously uttered either the locution **open_dialogue**($P_j, q?$) or the locution **enter_dialogue**($P_j, q?$), we do not list this precondition under each locution; only those preconditions specific to the locution concerned are listed. Likewise, all locutions other than **open_dialogue**($P_j, q?$) and **enter_dialogue**($P_j, q?$) require that the speaker not have previously withdrawn from the dialogue, and this precondition is also not listed explicitly.

L3: The **propose(.)** locution:

Locution: **propose**($P_i, type, t$), where t is a sentence, and *type* is an element of the set {*action, goal, constraint, perspective, fact, evaluation*}.

Preconditions: No agent P_j has previously uttered **propose**($P_j, type, t$). In addition, before an agent P_i may utter **propose**($P_i, action, a$), some agent P_j (possibly P_i) must have uttered either **propose**($P_i, type, t$) or **assert**($P_i, type, t$), for some $type \in \{goal, constraint, perspective, fact\}$.

Meaning: Participant P_i proposes sentence t as a valid instance of type *type*.

Response: No response required.

Commitment Store Update: No effects.

L4: The **assert(.)** locution:

Locution: $\text{assert}(P_i, \text{type}, t)$, where t is a sentence, and type is an element of the set $\{\text{action}, \text{goal}, \text{constraint}, \text{perspective}, \text{fact}, \text{evaluation}\}$.

Preconditions: Agent P_i has not previously uttered $\text{assert}(P_i, \text{type}, t)$. In addition, before an agent P_i may utter $\text{assert}(P_i, \text{evaluation}, e)$, some agent P_j (possibly P_i) must have uttered either $\text{propose}(P_i, \text{action}, a)$ or $\text{assert}(P_i, \text{action}, a)$, for some action a which is referenced in sentence e .

Meaning: Participant P_i asserts sentence t as a valid instance of type type .

Response: No response required.

Commitment Store Update: The 2-tuple (type, t) is inserted into $CS(P_i)$, the Commitment Store of participant P_i . In the case agent P_i utters the locution $\text{assert}(P_i, \text{action}, t)$ and this follows an utterance of $\text{move}(P_j, \text{action}, t)$ by some other agent P_j , then any earlier entry in the Commitment Store of participant P_i of the form (action, s) , for some s , is simultaneously removed from the Commitment Store $CS(P_i)$.

L5: The $\text{prefer}(\cdot)$ locution:

Locution: $\text{prefer}(P_i, a, b)$, where a and b are sentences of type actions .

Preconditions: Some participants P_j and P_k , possibly including P_i , must previously have uttered the locution $\text{assert}(P_j, \text{evaluation}, e)$ and the locution $\text{assert}(P_k, \text{evaluation}, f)$, where e and f are sentences of type evaluation which refer respectively to action-options a and b .

Meaning: Participant P_i indicates a preference for action-option a over action-option b .

Response: No response required.

Commitment Store Update: The 3-tuple (prefer, a, b) is inserted into $CS(P_i)$, the Commitment Store of P_i .

L6: The $\text{ask_justify}(\cdot)$ locution:

Locution: $\text{ask_justify}(P_j, P_i, \text{type}, t)$, where type is an element of the set $\{\text{action}, \text{goal}, \text{constraint}, \text{perspective}, \text{fact}, \text{evaluation}\}$.

Preconditions: Participant P_i has previously uttered the locution $\text{assert}(P_i, \text{type}, t)$ and this utterance has not subsequently been retracted by P_i .

Meaning: Participant P_j asks participant P_i to provide a justification of sentence t of type type , where $(\text{type}, t) \in CS(P_i)$.

Response: P_i must respond in one of the following three ways:

- Retract the sentence t , or
- Seek to persuade P_j in an embedded persuasion dialogue that sentence t is a valid instance of type type , or
- Seek to persuade P_j in an embedded persuasion dialogue that no justification is required for the assertion that t is a valid instance of type type .

Commitment Store Update: No effects.

L7: The **move(.)** locution:

Locution: **move**($P_i, action, a$), where a is a sentence of type *action*.

Preconditions: Some participant P_j , possibly P_i , must previously have uttered either **propose**($P_i, action, a$) or **assert**($P_i, action, a$), and such an utterance has not subsequently been retracted by the participant who uttered it.

Meaning: Participant P_i proposes that each participant pronounce on whether they assert sentence a as the action to be decided upon by the group.

Response: Other participants P_j must each respond with either an utterance of **assert**($P_j, action, a$) or an utterance of **reject**($P_j, action, a$). No other response is permitted.

Commitment Store Update: The 2-tuple ($action, a$) is inserted into $CS(P_i)$. In addition, any earlier entry in the Commitment Store of participant P_i of the form ($action, s$), for some s , is simultaneously removed from the Commitment Store $CS(P_i)$.

L8: The **reject(.)** locution:

Locution: **reject**($P_j, action, a$), where a is a sentence of type *action*.

Preconditions: Some participant P_i , not P_j , has previously uttered **move**($P_i, action, a$).

Meaning: Participant P_j wishes to reject the assertion of action a as the action to be decided upon by the group.

Response: No response is required.

Commitment Store Update: If the 2-tuple ($action, a$) is contained in $CS(P_i)$ prior to this utterance, then it is deleted.

L9: The **retract(.)** locution:

Locution: **retract**($P_i, locution$), where *locution* is one of the locutions, **assert(.)**, **move(.)** or **prefer(.)**.

Preconditions: Participant P_i must have previously uttered and not subsequently retracted the locution *locution*.

Meaning: Participant P_i expresses a retraction of a previous utterance *locution*, where *locution* is one of the following three locutions: **assert**($P_i, type, t$), **move**($P_i, action, a$) or **prefer**(P_i, a, b).

Response: No response required.

Commitment Store Update: Exactly one of: (a) the 2-tuple ($type, t$); (b) the 2-tuple ($action, a$); or (c) the 3-tuple ($prefer, a, b$) is deleted from $CS(P_i)$, according to whichever of the three possible prior locutions is being retracted.

L10: The **withdraw_dialogue(.)** locution:

Locution: **withdraw_dialogue**($P_i, q?$), where q is a sentence of type *action* or a sentential function whose values are of type *action* (possibly conjoined with the sentence that exactly one sequence of objects satisfies the function).

Preconditions: Participant P_i must not previously have uttered a **withdraw.dialogue**($P_i, q?$) locution.

Meaning: Participant P_i announces her withdrawal from the deliberation dialogue considering the governing question $q?$.

Response: No response required. If only two participants remain in a dialogue and one of these utters this locution, the dialogue terminates.

Commitment Store Update: No effects.

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